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Understanding attention selection in driving: From 
limited capacity to adaptive behaviour 
 
Johan Engström 
Division of Vehicle Safety, Department of Applied Mechanics 
Chalmers University of Technology 
 
Abstract 
Accident analysis studies have consistently identified attention-related failures as key factors 
behind road crashes. However, less is known about how such failures lead to accidents. 
Traditionally, one reason for this knowledge gap has been a lack of sufficiently detailed data 
from the pre-crash phase, although this situation is currently changing with the advent of 
naturalistic driving studies. However, a remaining issue is the lack of an adequate conceptual 
model of attention selection applicable in natural driving situations. Existing attention models 
applied in the driving domain are generally based on the notion of attention as a resource with 
limited capacity, subject to overload in demanding conditions. Such models have mainly 
focused on dual task interference in experimental situations and but have put less emphasis on 
aspects central to attention selection in everyday driving such as expectancy and anticipatory 
attention allocation. The general objective of the present thesis was to obtain a better 
understanding of the relation between attention, performance and crash risk in real driving 
situations. To this end, a general conceptual framework for understanding attention selection 
in natural driving was developed, based on the view of attention selection as a form of 
adaptive behaviour rather than a consequence of limited information processing capacity. This 
also involved the development of a specific model of attention selection mechanisms and a 
series of empirical studies to support the model development. The main objective of these 
studies was to better understand the effects of working memory (or cognitive-) load on 
driving performance and the key mechanisms behind expectancy and proactive attention 
scheduling in driving. A key finding was that working memory load appears to selectively 
affect aspects of driving performance that can be characterised as controlled, while leaving 
reflexive and habitual, automatic, behaviours largely unaffected, an idea that resolves several 
inconsistent findings in the existing literature. Based on the proposed model, precise 
definitions of attention, expectancy, driver inattention and driver distraction were proposed. 
The thesis also suggests a general conceptualisation of the relation between attention selection 
and crashes. Finally, practical applications of the present findings in the areas of accident and 
incident analysis, countermeasure development and evaluation methods are discussed. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Attention, adaptive driver behaviour, driving performance, expectancy, accident 
analysis, working memory load, driver distraction 
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1 Introduction 
Imagine a truck driver on busy arterial on his way to deliver goods at a grocery store in the 
city centre, a route that he travels several times every week. He is involved in an intense 
conversation on the phone and needs to change lane to the right in order to exit the road. He 
looks in the rear-view mirror to check for potential traffic approaching from behind. 
Meanwhile, a traffic queue has rapidly built up ahead and when our driver looks back to the 
road, he finds himself crashing into the queue.  
 
How can we understand the chain of events that led to this crash, and the mechanisms 
involved? One key issue is why the driver decided to take the eyes off the road at this 
inopportune moment. Did the fact that he has travelled this route hundreds of times, making 
the same manoeuvre without any incident contribute? What was the role of the phone 
conversation? Did it cause a failure to notice the queue ahead in the first place? Did the 
divided attention between the phone conversation and driving critically delay the braking 
response when looking back to the road? To what extent were the visual cues from the closing 
lead vehicle able to attract the driver’s attention and gaze?  
 
A further issue concerns the precise meaning of terms such as “attention”, “driver inattention” 
and “driver distraction” and how attention-related factors can be classified in a coherent way 
in accident and incident analysis. Should we regard our example truck driver as inattentive 
due to the phone conversation? Should the rear-view glance be regarded as another instance 
of driver inattention? If so, how do these forms of inattention differ? Should we classify any 
of these phenomena as driver distraction? 
 
Finally, what are the most effective countermeasures against inadequate attention selection 
and its consequences, and how can we evaluate the effectiveness of such countermeasures 
prior to introduction? These are some of the key theoretical and practical questions addressed 
by the present thesis.  
 
1.1 The need to understand attention selection in driving  
Road crashes is one of the world’s major societal problems. Every year, about 1.2 million 
people are killed and 20-50 million injured in road crashes worldwide (Peden et al, 2004). 
Accident studies have consistently cited driver inattention as the most prevalent specific 
factor behind road crashes (Treat et al., 1979; Wang, Knipling and Goodman, 1996). More 
recently, this has been further supported by naturalistic driving studies. In the recent 100-car 
study, driver inattention was assigned as a contributing factor in 78% of the crashes and 65% 
of the near-crashes investigated (Dingus et al., 2006). Similar results were found by two 
naturalistic driving studies that investigated driver distraction in commercial vehicle 
operations (Olson et al., 2009; Hickman, Hanowski and Bocanegra, 2010). 
 
However, despite major research efforts in the past decades, including in-depth accident 
analysis, naturalistic driving and experimental studies conducted on-road, on test tracks or in 
simulators, many of the questions asked above remain unresolved and are subject to hot 
current scientific and political debate. For example, while a large number of experimental 
studies have demonstrated significant impairments in driving performance due to mobile 
phone conversation (see e.g., Horrey and Wickens, 2006), recent naturalistic driving studies 
have found hands-free phone conversation to have a protective effect on crash risk (Olson et 
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al., 2009; Hickman et al., 2010). Thus, while we know that inattention is a key factor in crash 
causation, we don’t have a clear picture of how different forms of inattention lead to crashes. 
A better understanding of the relation between attention, driving performance and crash 
causation is needed to identify the most critical aspects of driver inattention and to develop 
efficient countermeasures. 
 
Part of the reason for this knowledge gap has been a lack of data from the pre-crash phase that 
are sufficiency detailed to identify specific attention-related factors. However, today this 
situation is changing rapidly with the advent of large-scale naturalistic collection of crashes 
and near crashes captured on video along with onboard sensor data. For example, the 
naturalistic database analysed by Hickman et al. (2010) comprised over 2000 crashes, which 
is comparable in size with major existing in-depth accident databases. However, a further 
problem is the lack of a clear conceptualisation of attention applicable in the driving domain. 
The concept of attention spans a broad range of phenomena and existing research on attention 
is generally fragmented and tends to deal with specific aspects of attention not always 
applicable to attention selection in natural tasks such as driving (Trick and Enns, 2009). Thus, 
there is a need for a general theoretical framework for addressing attention selection in natural 
driving situations which, together with more specific models of attentional mechanisms, can 
be used to guide the interpretation of naturalistic and experimental data as well as the 
development of effective inattention countermeasures and evaluation methods. 
 
1.2 General aim and scope 
The general aim of the present thesis is to obtain an improved understanding of the relation 
between attention, driving performance and crash risk. To this end, the present thesis includes 
theoretical as well as empirical work. The theoretical developments include a general 
framework for understanding adaptive driver behaviour (Paper IV) as well as a more specific 
model of attention selection mechanisms based on this framework (Paper V). The empirical 
studies (Paper I-III) address a number of outstanding empirical issues in order to support the 
model development. The specific aims of the thesis are stated in Chapter 4 based on the 
literature reviews in Chapter 2 and 3.  
 
Key intended applications of the empirical and theoretical results developed in the thesis 
include more precise and coherent definitions of attention-related mechanisms in accident and 
incident analysis, the development of inattention countermeasures and methods for evaluating 
such countermeasures. 
 
In order to keep the scope within reasonable limits, the present thesis focuses mainly on 
aspects related to visual attention, working memory load 1  and expectancy. Hence, 
mechanisms behind physiological impairments that may lead to inattention, such as 
drowsiness, fatigue and intoxication will not be addressed in detail. Moreover, issues specific 
to attention in non-visual modalities, such as auditory attention, are touched upon but are 
outside the main scope of the current thesis. 
 
                                                 
1
 “Cognitive load” is the term most commonly used in the literature to refer to the demands imposed of non-
visual tasks such as phone conversation. In most cases this refers specifically to load on working memory. Since 
“working memory load” has a more precise meaning, it will be used throughout this thesis (one exception, 
however, is Paper I which was written as part of a larger set of studies that used the more traditional 
terminology).  
 3 
1.3 Outline  
The thesis is organised as follows: The following chapter provides a review of empirical 
studies on attention in driving, with the aim to identify key gaps in our current understanding 
of the relation between attention, performance and crashes. Chapter 3 then provides a critical 
review of existing theoretical frameworks and models for understanding attention, with a 
particular focus on their potential application in natural driving situations. Based on Chapter 2 
and 3, Chapter 4 defines the specific aims of the thesis.  
 
Chapter 5 provides summaries of the papers included in the thesis, while Chapter 6 discusses 
the key theoretical and empirical contributions of the thesis with respect to its specific aims. 
Chapter 6 also discusses the application of these contributions to the three main areas 
identified above: Accident and incident analysis, countermeasures and evaluation methods. 
 
 
 
 4 
2 Empirical studies on attention in driving 
 
This chapter provides a review of existing empirical work on the relation between attention, 
performance and crash risk in the driving context, with the purpose to identify the most 
important specific research gaps. The review covers accident and incident analysis as well as 
experimental studies conducted in driving simulators, on test tracks or in real traffic.  
 
2.1 Accident and incident analysis 
Various forms of inattention have been frequently been cited as major factors contributing to 
accidents. The next section reviews results from traditional accident analysis while Section 
2.1.2 addresses naturalistic observation and driving studies. 
 
2.1.1 Traditional accident analysis 
National accident statistical databases, largely based on police reports, mainly contain 
information on the outcome of crashes (e.g., in terms of injuries and fatalities) and general 
circumstances (e.g., road type, time of day and weather conditions) but generally include little 
information on specific pre-crash factors such as those related to inattention. However, some 
countries, most notably the US, do report general statistics on inattention-related factors. For 
example, based on the analysis of several existing national databases, the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) estimates that 16% of fatal crashes and 20% of injury 
crashes during 2009 involved distracted driving (NHTSA, 2010). However, such figures are 
naturally subject to great uncertainty, given the difficulties for police officers to identify 
inattention-related factors when arriving at the accident site. Moreover, even if such factors 
are reported by victims or witnesses, it is uncertain to what degree they actually contributed to 
the crash, let alone how they contributed. 
 
Other studies have used epidemiological techniques to study the impact of, in particular, 
mobile phone use on crash risk. Such studies typically use billing records to establish when 
cell phone calls began and ended and compare this to the estimated time of the crash. For 
example, Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997) and McEvoy et al. (2005) both found a fourfold 
increase in crash risk due to mobile phone conversation. However, Young and Schreiner 
(2009), who compared automatic notifications of airbag deployment with billing records for 
hands-free conversations using the OnStar onboard system, found no significantly increased 
crash risk. Hence, results from epidemiological studies remain rather controversial and the 
debate has mainly focused on limitations of the statistical techniques used to calculate crash 
risk. However, these types of studies do say little, if anything, about the mechanisms behind 
crashes, which is the main topic of the present thesis.   
 
Some more detailed information on the role of inattention in crash causation may be gained 
from in-depth accident studies, which refer to more thorough “on-the-spot” analysis of a 
smaller set of accidents, often carried out by a multidisciplinary team of researchers. 
Identification of driver-related pre-crash factors such as inattention is generally based on in-
depth interviews of victims and witnesses (Sandin, 2007). Such studies have consistently 
identified inattention as the most prevalent single factor contributing to accidents. The 
classical Indiana Tri-level study (Treat et al., 1977) involved in- on-site investigations at three 
levels of depth in the state of Indiana, US. This study identified “human-factors” (in addition 
to vehicle- and environment factors) as definite or probable cause in 93% of accidents. Of 
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these “human direct causes”, recognition errors was identified as the largest factor, 
contributing to 56% of all the crashes investigated. Furthermore, four principal forms of 
recognition errors were identified: Improver lookout (23%), inattention 2  (15%), external 
distraction (4%) and drowsiness/fatigue (2%). More recently, Wang et al. (1996) performed 
an analysis of 1995 entries the US National Accident Sampling System (NASS) 
Crashworthiness Data System, with the specific goal to investigate the role of driver 
inattention. The results showed that, in total, 25.5% of tow-away crashes involved inattention 
as a contributing factor. The main sub-categories were distracted (13.2%), looked by did not 
see (9.7%) and sleepy/fell asleep (2.6%). In addition, in 45.7% of the crashes the contributing 
factors were classified as “unknown”, which indicates a significant degree of underreporting. 
However, as pointed out by Rumar (1990), the incoherency and lack of scientific basis behind 
the classification schemes used makes the data from in-depth accident analysis difficult to 
interpret. 
 
Both Treat et al. (1977) and Wang et al. (1995) identified looked-but-failed-to-see as a major 
factor contributing to crashes. This refers to cases where the driver has looked in the direction 
of the hazard but failed to react to it. Brown (2005) reviewed in-depth accident analysis and 
police report data from UK and the US from the 1970’s and onwards. The results indicate that 
LBFTS has consistently been attributed as a major accident cause and has even been proposed 
as the main attentional/perceptual contributory factor during daylight. However, as pointed 
out by Brown (2005), these figures are essentially based on subjective data which makes it 
difficult to draw any strong conclusions. For example, “I did not see” may be used as an 
excuse to hide traffic rule violations or carelessness. 
 
While existing in-depth accident analyses, mainly based on police reports and interview data,  
strongly indicate a key role of inattention in crash causation, they do not say much about the 
mechanisms behind the different types of attention failures or how they lead to crashes. Thus, 
until recently, very little was known about the relation between attention failures and crashes. 
However, this has changed radically in the past few years, as reviewed in the following 
section.  
 
2.1.2 Naturalistic observation 
Naturalistic observation generally refers to unintrusive observation of driver behaviour in 
naturalistic settings. One approach to naturalistic driving observation is represented by the 
work of Summala and colleagues, who investigated potential causes for car-bicycle collisions 
at T-junctions and roundabouts which featured an intersecting two-way bicycle lane. 
Summala, Pasanen et al. (1996) observed drivers’ visual search patterns at left and right turns 
in such intersections by means of cameras located at the roadway. The results showed that, 
when turning left, drivers tended to look both left and right since, in this case, potential 
hazards (oncoming cars) were expected from both directions. However, when turning right, 
glances to the right were far less common since no real hazards were expected from this 
direction (in right-hand traffic). A further in-depth study on car-bicycle accidents in these 
types of intersections confirmed that such accidents were more common at right turns with the 
bicycle approaching from the right than in other scenario configurations (Räsänen and 
Summala, 1998). The authors concluded that these car-bicycle crashes occurred due to the 
erroneous expectation that cars approaching from the left were the only relevant hazards, 
which led to insufficient scanning to the right. As a result, bicyclists coming from the right, 
                                                 
2
 Inattention was here defined rather narrowly as “pre-occupation with competing thoughts” 
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who had right of way and believed that the driver saw them, appeared outside the drivers’ 
field of view and thus failed to capture the drivers’ attention. (Summala and Räsänen, 2000) 
 
More recently, several naturalistic driving studies have collected in-vehicle data over longer 
time periods in naturalistic settings. This data generally includes video recordings from 
multiple hidden cameras (directed, e.g., at the driver’s face and the road ahead) as well as data 
from onboard sensors. The first major naturalistic driving study was the US 100-car study, 
which was finalised in 2005 (Dingus et al., 2006; Klauer et al., 2006). This was followed up 
by a study by Olson et al. (2009) which focused specifically on driver distraction in 
commercial vehicle operation (CVO)3. Finally, Hickman et al. (2010) analysed commercial 
vehicle (truck and bus) data collected from the DriveCam4 onboard safety monitoring system. 
The DriveCam database analysed comprises video and kinematic data from a very large 
number of safety-critical events, including over 2000 crashes. An overview of the number of 
safety relevant events analysed in these studies is given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Number of safety relevant events in three naturalistic driving studies reviewed 
Study Crashes Near-
crashes 
Incidents/crash 
relevant 
conflicts 
Unintentional 
lane deviations 
100-car (Dingus et al., 
2006; Klauer et al., 2006) 
69 761 8295  
CVO (Olson et al., 2009)  21 197 3019 1215 
DriveCam (Hickman et al., 
2010)5 
2421 24 239 204 252  
 
 
In the 100-car study, driver inattention was categorised into four main sub-classes: (1) 
secondary task engagement, (2) fatigue, (3) non-specific eye glance and (4) driving-related 
inattention to the forward roadway. It was found that 78% of the crashes and 65% of the near-
crashes had at least one of these inattention categories assigned as a contributing factor, where 
secondary task engagement was the most frequent (Dingus et al., 2006). Another important 
general finding was that the frequency of inattention related factors increased strongly with 
the severity of the event. As shown in Figure 1, the proportion of inattentive drivers was much 
higher for crashes than for near crashes and incidents. This indicates that inattention is often 
what makes a critical incident develop into a crash (Dingus et al., 2006). 
                                                 
3
 This study combined data from two naturalistic data collection efforts, the Drowsy Driver Warning System 
Field Operational Test (Hanowski et al., 2008) and the Naturalistic Truck Driving Study (Blanco et al., in press) 
and involved only truck drivers. 
4
 This is an aftermarket device equipped with cameras recording the driver and the forward road scene, as well as 
some kinematic sensors. See www.drivecam.com 
5
 While the total data set contained over 2000 crashes, baseline data, which is needed to calculate odds ratios, 
was only available for a subset of the data containing 1085 crashes, 8375 near crashes and 30 661 crash-relevant 
conflicts. The definitions of these severity categories were regarded as proprietary information by DriveCam 
thus not reported in Hickman et al. (2010). 
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Figure 1 Proportions of inattentive drivers for the three levels of criticality in the 100-car study (from 
Dingus et al., 2006) 
 
A more detailed analysis was conducted on rear-end scenarios in the 100-car study where it 
was found that 13/14 of the lead vehicle crashes (93%) and 68% of the near lead-vehicle 
crashes involved inattention to the forward roadway as a contributing factor. Hence, the 
results from the 100-car study indicate that inattention is an even more common factor than 
previously suggested by in-depth accident analyses, in particular for certain types of accidents. 
Further analysis of kinematic data suggested that a key mechanism behind these rear-end 
crashes was the co-occurrence of attention directed off-road and an unexpected event, for 
example, a lead vehicle suddenly braking (Dingus et al., 2006). In line with this, Lee et al 
(2007), in a more detailed follow up-study on the rear-end events, found that eyes-off-road, 
but not kinematic parameters (such as time-to-collision), distinguished crashes from near 
crashes for this type of event. By contrast to the in-depth analyses reviewed above, the 100-
car study did not find looked-but-failed-to-see (LBFTS) to be a major factor6. LBFTS was not 
coded for any crash, for only two near-crashes and only ten incidents. 
 
A key advantage of naturalistic driving data is the possibility to calculate the risk associated 
with various activities and factors such as secondary tasks and the time that the eyes are taken 
off the road prior to the crash. This is done by comparing safety relevant events to baseline 
(non-event) data, randomly sampled from the whole data set, with respect to the prevalence of 
the specific factor. The risk is normally calculated in terms of odds ratios, which represents 
the relative risk for a safety critical event when the factor is present, and population 
attributable risk which also takes into account the exposure to the factor. We will focus here 
on odds ratios, where a significant difference from one represents significantly lower or 
higher relative risk for being involved in a safety-critical event. 
 
All three studies included in Table 1 calculated odds ratios for various secondary task 
activities. While Klauer et. al (2006) only included crashes and near crashes in the analysis, 
                                                 
6
 LBFTS was, somewhat oddly, categorised under “daydreaming” together with the sub-categories “lost in 
thought” and “other”. 
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Olson et al. (2009) and Hickman et al. (2010) based their calculation on all the types of safety 
critical events listed in Table 1. Some examples of obtained odds ratios are given in Table 2. 
It should be noted that the types of secondary tasks differ between the studies mainly because 
the 100-car study only involved private car drivers while and the other two studies involved 
commercial vehicle drivers. 
 
Table 2 Examples of odds ratios for different secondary task activities found in the three naturalistic 
driving studies. Entries in bold were significantly different from one.   
Activity 100-car (Klauer 
et al., 2006) 
CVO (Olson et 
al., 2009) 
DriveCam 
(Hickman et al., 
2010) 
Looking at external object  3.70   
Reading  3.38 3.97  
Applying makeup  3.13   
Dial cell phone  2.79 5.93 3.5 
Talking/listening to a hands-held phone 1.29 1.04  0.90  
Talking/listening to a hands-free phone  0.44 0.65 
Text messaging on a cell phone  23.2 163.6 
Interact with/look at a dispatching device  9.93  
Write on pad/note book etc.  8.98  
Use calculator  8.21  
Talk or listen to citizens band (CB) radio   0.55  
 
 
The results summarised in Table 2 were generally consistent between studies and strongly 
indicate that secondary tasks requiring visual interaction are the ones most associated with 
risk. In particular, extreme values were found for text messaging in the two commercial 
vehicle studies (text messaging was not available in the US at the time the 100-car study). A 
further analysis by Olson et al. (2009) also revealed a strong correlation between the relative 
risk associated with a task and degree to which the task led the driver to glance off-road. 
Tasks with the highest odds ratios were also associated with the largest proportion of eyes off 
the forward roadway (see Hanowski et al., in review, for a more detailed discussion on this 
finding). Furthermore, purely working memory-loading, non-visual, tasks such as mobile 
phone conversation did not significantly increase risk in any of the studies. By contrast, both 
Olson et al. (2009) and Hickman et al. (2010) found significantly reduced risk during 
conversation on a hand-held phone and Olson et al. (2009) found the same effect for the use 
of a CB radio. 
 
Klauer et al (2006) and Olson et al. (2009) also estimated the odds ratios for being involved in 
a crash or near crash (Klauer et al., 2006) or safety critical event (Olson et al., 2009) as a 
function of the duration that the eyes were directed off-road within a time window of 5 
seconds before and 1 second after the onset of the critical event. The results from both studies 
are plotted in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2 Odds ratios as a function of the total time of eyes off the forward roadway (graph constructed 
from data in Klauer et al. (2006) and Olson et al. (2009). Asterisks indicate odds ratios significantly 
different from one. 
 
As shown by the Figure, the results from the two studies were strongly consistent, with the 
main elevated risk for total off-road glance times longer than 2 seconds. However, perhaps 
less intuitively, also short glance times (<0.5s) also seems to increase risk somewhat, although 
the difference was only significant in Olson et al. (2009). Olson et al. (2009) also 
demonstrated that eyes-off-road time was related to the severity of the event, with longest 
eyes-off-road times for crashes (mean 2.1 s), followed by near crashes (mean 1.7 s), crash-
relevant conflict (mean 1.6 s.) and baseline (mean 1.2 s). This finding is also generally 
consistent with the findings from the 100-car study (Klauer et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2007). 
 
To summarise, existing naturalistic driving studies have consistently demonstrated an 
elevated risk of being involved in safety-critical events for tasks requiring visual interaction, 
with a particularly high risk for text messaging. Moreover, the eyes-off-road time just prior to 
the event is strongly related to the risk of being involved in a safety-critical event and is also 
correlated to the severity of the event. This indicates that a key mechanism whereby 
inattention causes crashes is the simultaneous occurrence of an off-road glance and an 
unexpected critical event, such as a lead vehicle braking. However, existing naturalistic 
driving studies do not say much about why people decide to look away at inopportune 
moments. By contrast, the studies by Summala and colleagues on car-bicycle accidents 
described above offer a more comprehensive analysis on how erroneous expectancies may 
lead to inadequate visual scanning which eventually lead to crashes. Primarily working 
memory loading tasks have not been found to increase risk in naturalistic driving studies. For 
some tasks (talking/listening to hands-free phone and CB radio) the relative risk for a safety-
critical event was even found to be significantly reduced.  
 
2.2 Experimental studies on attention in driving 
Experimental studies, conducted in driving simulators, test tracks or in real traffic offer the 
possibility to manipulate specific aspects of attention selection in order to reveal underlying 
causal relations between attention and driving performance. They may thus be viewed as an 
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important complement to the analysis of real-world accidents and incidents reviewed in the 
previous section. However, a critical issue is to what extent the effects obtained in controlled 
experiments generalise to real world driving.  
 
The vast majority of existing experimental studies on attention in driving have focused on 
how the operation of different types of secondary tasks affects driving performance. These 
studies have generally employed a dual task paradigm where subjects are instructed to 
perform secondary tasks while driving. Such tasks have included conversing on the phone or 
entering a destination into a navigation system, as well as artificial tasks such as counting 
backwards or rehearsing a list of items in working memory. A general distinction can be made 
between tasks that require the driver to shift gaze between the road and the task, what is 
commonly referred to as visual time sharing, and tasks that only impose cognitive, or more 
precisely, working memory demands. The next section reviews effects of visual time sharing 
while section 2.2.2 deals with effects of working memory load. 
 
While dual task studies dominate the experimental literature on attention in driving, there has 
also been an increasing interest in the relation between expectancy and attention selection, 
how attention is dynamically scheduled in natural driving situations and the self-regulatory of 
deployment of attention. Studies addressing these aspects are reviewed in Section 2.2.3. 
 
2.2.1 Effects of visual time sharing 
The effect of visual time sharing between driving and a secondary task (typically the 
operation of some in-vehicle information system)  on vehicle control has been addressed in 
numerous studies. The results from such studies have rather consistently found an increase in 
lateral control variability (e.g. Zwahlen, Adams, & de Bald, 1988; Greenberg et al., 2003; 
Östlund et al., 2004; Horrey, Wickens and Consalus, 2006; Merat and Jamson, 2008) 
accompanied by a reduction in speed (e.g. Curry, et al., 1975; Antin et al., 1990; Merat and 
Jamson, 2008). Studies employing a car following scenario have also found that drivers tend 
to increase headway during visual time sharing (e.g., Merat and Jamson, 2008).  
 
Several studies have also found that visual time sharing impairs object and event detection. 
For example, Lee et al. (2002) found a large effect of visual distraction on responses in a lead 
vehicle braking scenario. For instance, 38% of the visually distracted participants collided 
with the lead vehicle compared to 14% of the non-distracted participants. Similar results were 
obtained by Horrey et al. (2006). Other studies have shown that visual time sharing also 
degrades detection of less urgent events such as severe lane keeping violations by other 
vehicles (Greenberg et al., 2003), slowing lead vehicles, brake light onsets, and turn signals of 
a following vehicle (Angell et al., 2006).  
 
An important issue is to what extent the driving performance impairments induced by visual 
time sharing are due to visual eccentricity (e.g., driving related stimuli appearing in the visual 
periphery, or entirely outside the field of view, during off-road glances) or due to attentional 
interference in the brain. In general, existing studies have not isolated these factors. One 
exception is a series of studies by Summala and colleagues who used the forced peripheral 
vision paradigm, where subjects are required to maintain gaze at a fixed point inside the 
vehicle without performing any attention-demanding task. Summala, Nieminen and Punto 
(1996) found that drivers were relatively good at maintaining lane position using their 
peripheral field of view. However, Lamble, Laakso and Summala (1999), found that the 
response times to a slowing lead vehicle increased strongly with visual eccentricity. This 
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indicates a dissociation between the effects of visual eccentricity on lane keeping and event 
detection.  
 
Other studies have indicated that also the attentional load imposed by visual tasks may affect 
response performance, independently of visual eccentricity. For example, Merat and Jamson 
(2008) compared the effect of secondary task on the detection of artificial stimuli presented in 
different modalities (visually, tactile, and auditory). One of the secondary tasks was manual 
phone dialling which required visual time sharing. It was found that the dialling task had the 
same effect on detection performance regardless of the modality of the stimulus to be 
detected. This indicates that a significant portion of the effect of visual time sharing on event 
detection is related to an attentional impairment independent of visual eccentricity and even 
sensory modality. 
 
In general, dual task studies on visual time sharing have yielded relatively consistent results 
which are also in line with the results from the naturalistic observation studies reviewed in 
Section 2.1.2. More specifically, experimental studies provide strong evidence that detection 
of critical on-road hazards is strongly impaired when gaze is directed off-road and detection 
has to rely on peripheral vision. This is consistent with the strong relation between eyes-off-
road and crash risk found in naturalistic driving studies. 
 
2.2.2 Effects of working memory load 
While the effects of visual time sharing on driving performance are rather consistent across 
studies, dual task studies that have investigated the effects of working memory load have 
yielded strongly inconsistent results. In general, working memory load does not seem to 
impair lateral control in normal driving conditions. Rather, numerous studies have found 
reduced lane keeping variability under conditions of working memory load (Brookhuis et al., 
1991; Östlund et al., 2004; Törnros and Bolling, 2005; Mazzae et al., 2005; Mattes, Föhl and 
Schindhelm, 2007; Horrey and Simons, 2007; Merat and Jamson, 2008; Mehler et al., 2009; 
Reimer, 2009). However, a contradictory result was obtained by Salvucci and Beltowska, 
(2008) who found that working memory load increased deviations from the lane centre during 
normal lane keeping. Moreover, several studies have found that working memory load 
degrades performance on artificial tracking tasks (Briem and Hedman, 1995; Strayer and 
Johnston, 2001; Creem and Profitt, 2001) or non-standard driving task such as steering with a 
track ball or a computer mouse while lying in a brain scanner (Just, Keller and Cynkar, 2008). 
Possible reasons for these inconsistent results have not, to the knowledge of the author, been 
addressed in the literature.  
 
Working memory load has also been found to induce a concentration of gaze towards the road 
centre (Recarte and Nunes, 2003; Harbluk et al., 2007; Reimer, 2009) and increased steering 
activity (Rakauskas, Gugerty and Ward, 2004). Other studies have quantified the effect of 
steering performance in terms of steering entropy (a measure of the disorder in steering wheel 
movement) and generally found increased steering entropy due to working memory load 
(Boer, 2000; Boer et al., 2005). 
 
Effects of working memory load on longitudinal control variables such as speed and headway 
are generally inconsistent between as well as within studies. For example, Patten et al. (2003) 
found a speed reduction during hand-held phone conversation but not for conversation on a 
hands-free phone. Horrey and Simons (2007) found increased headway in car following 
situations due to working memory load but no increase in safety margins during overtaking 
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and merging. A set of parallel studies conducted in the HASTE EU-funded project found 
small effects of working memory load in both directions for speed and headway measures 
(Östlund et al., 2004).  
 
Working memory load has also been found to impair object and event detection. Several 
studies have investigated the effect of working memory load on responses to artificial stimuli 
in the Peripheral Detection Task (PDT) paradigm (e.g., Törnros and Bolling, 2005; Patten et 
al. 2003; Merat and Jamson, 2008). In this paradigm, visual stimuli are presented in the 
peripheral field of view with some temporal (and sometimes spatial) variation with an average 
inter-stimulus interval of about 4 seconds. These studies have consistently found increased 
response time due to working memory load. 
 
Other studies have investigated the effects of working memory load on braking responses in 
lead vehicle braking scenarios (e.g., Brookhuis, et. al.1991; Alm & Nilsson, 1995; Lee et al., 
2001; Strayer, Drews and Johnston. 2003; Strayer and Drews, 2004; Strayer, Drews and 
Crouch, 2006; Levy, Pashler and Boer, 2006; Salvucci and Beltowska, 2008). These studies 
have generally found delayed responses due to working memory load. However, one puzzling 
aspect of these studies is that the magnitude of the observed response delay differs strongly 
between studies, from 50 ms in the study by Salvucci and Beltowska (2008) to about 1500 ms 
for older drivers in the study by Alm and Nilsson (1995).  
 
Another finding that casts some doubt of the generality of the effects of working memory load 
on responses to critical events was obtained by Muttart et al. (2007) who had the brake lights 
of the lead vehicle turned off. By contrast to the studies cited above, which all involved brake 
light onsets, no effect of working memory load was found when the lead vehicle was just 
braking unexpectedly (with brake lights turned off). However, working memory load 
impaired responses in scenarios where the lead vehicle braking event was cued by 
downstream traffic events. Similarly, Baumann et al. (2008) conducted a simulator study 
investigating the effect of working memory load on the ability to use a predictive cue (a 
warning sign) to guide responses to obstacles hidden behind curves. It was found that working 
memory load only delayed response performance in the cued condition. These studies indicate 
that working memory load mainly affects responses to cued events (where brake light onsets 
may be regarded as a predictive cue) while leaving responses to non-cued events, triggered 
solely by looming (optical expansion), unaffected. If this is true, working memory load may 
have little effect on responses to critical hazards in many real-world situations, contrary to 
what is generally assumed. These apparently contradictory results have not been further 
addressed in the literature. 
 
Working memory load has also been found to impair the semantic encoding of information 
into long-term memory. For example, Strayer et al., (2003) found that working memory load 
severely impaired the ability to recall roadside billboards in a post-drive recognition memory 
test. This effect occurred even if the billboard signs were fixated, indicating that the result 
was not due to the gaze concentration effect mentioned above. 
 
Finally, working memory load has been found to induce physiological arousal. For example, 
Mehler et al. (2010) found a systematic increase in heart rate and skin conductance with 
incremental increases in working memory load. 
 
To summarise, while working memory load has been found to influence several aspects of 
driving performance, the results of existing studies are often inconsistent or directly in 
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conflict. This holds for effects on lateral control, longitudinal control as well as responses to 
critical events. Thus, it seems like that working memory load selectively affects certain 
aspects of driving performance while leaving others unaffected, and sometimes even enhances 
performance. However, no general explanation for these divergent findings is offered in the 
literature. Moreover, the (sometimes very large, see Alm and Nilsson, 1995) response delays 
found in many dual task studies, both for responses to artificial stimuli and braking lead 
vehicles, appear to contradict the findings from several naturalistic driving studies (Olson et 
al., 2009; Hickman et al., 2010) that working memory load reduced the risk for being 
involved in safety critical events.  
 
2.2.3 Expectancy, proactive attention scheduling and self-regulation of 
attentional effort  
Task goals as well as specific expectations on how upcoming traffic situations will develop, 
critically determine attention selection, perception and decision making, and may play a 
critical role in crash causation, as demonstrated, for example, by the work of Summala and 
colleagues (e.g., Summala and Räsänen, 2000) reviewed in section 2.1.2. The key role of 
expectancy in driving has been acknowledged for a long time by traffic psychologists and 
road engineers. For example Hills (1980) stated that expectancies “…can profoundly affect 
the driver’s interpretation of the various visual features and signals in a scene and also the 
various visual judgements he has to make. It is believed that these could partly explain why, 
anecdotally, a driver can look straight at a cyclist or a motorcyclist and then drive straight out 
into him. It is thought that the driver is looking for cars and/or larger vehicles since there is a 
high probability that any potential conflict is going to be with that type of vehicle…” (p. 193).   
However, these phenomena have not, until recently, been systematically addressed in 
experimental research, at least not in the driving domain.  
 
A meta-analysis by Green (2000) identified expectancy as the most important factor 
determining braking response times to critical events. Theeuwes (1996) examined the effect 
of expectancy on visual search patterns of subjects watching video recordings of intersection 
approaches. The subjects were instructed to search for a traffic sign indicating a left or right 
turn and press a left or right button accordingly. Both response times and the time to fixate the 
sign were strongly increased when the sign was located in an unexpected location. 
 
Recent studies have also explored the dynamic allocation of visual attention in natural 
environments and tasks. Hayhoe (2000) and Hayhoe and Ballard (2005) review research in 
this area. Examination of eye movements in natural tasks such as making a sandwich, playing 
table tennis and driving, have demonstrated that fixations are seldom made to objects that are 
irrelevant to the task at hand. This shows that the moment-to-moment allocation of visual 
attention critically depends on the specific task context and the operator’s current task goals. 
Moreover, the information acquired during a single glance is strongly task specific. Hayhoe 
(2000) suggests that specialised visual routines are applied to extract the immediately relevant 
information (e.g., a red traffic light) from a scene. Furthermore, Hayhoe (2000) introduced the 
scheduling problem which concerns how individual visual routines are dynamically composed 
into attention allocation patterns matched to the task context. Shinoda, Hayhoe and 
Shrivastava (2001) investigated attention scheduling in the driving context. In a driving 
simulator study, subjects were either asked to adhere to traffic rules or just follow a lead 
vehicle. A no parking sign was replaced by a stop sign for a limited period of time (0.5-1 s.). 
The change was masked by a white frame in order to eliminate visual transients. The sign was 
either placed in an unexpected location along the road or at an expected location in an 
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intersection. Analysis of eye movements, braking responses and verbal reports revealed that 
detection of the stop sign was strongly influenced by both task instruction and sign location, 
with the highest detection probabilities for subjects instructed to follow traffic rules and when 
the sign was located at the intersection. This shows that the allocation of visual attention in 
driving is strongly proactive and driven top-down by the current task goals and driving 
context.  
  
Related phenomena were studied by Martens (2007). In these studies, subjects drove the same 
simulated route a large number of times over several consecutive days. In the last session, a 
traffic rule (e.g. priority rule at an intersection) was changed, as indicated, for example, by a 
new sign and painted road markings. The majority of the subjects did not exhibit any response 
to the change, even if they, in many cases, visually fixated the new road sign. In one study, 
these effects were even found without the repeated exposure to the route (Martens, 2007, Ch. 
11) which, indicates that strong expectations, and resulting blindness to important 
information, can be invoked by the road design itself regardless of repeated exposure. 
 
These effects are related to the phenomena known as change- and inattention blindness. The 
former refers to the inability to detect a change in a visual scene if the visual transient 
associated with the change is masked (Rensink, 2007). By contrast, inattention blindness 
refers to the inability to detect salient stimuli appearing in the field of view if attention is 
allocated elsewhere (e.g., Mack and Rock, 1998). Change- and inattentional blindness may 
also be related to the looked-but-failed-to-see phenomenon that, as reviewed above, has been 
suggested as a common crash contributing factor in in-depth accident analysis (Brown, 2005).  
These phenomena have recently also been demonstrated in driving simulator studies (Lee, 
Lee and Boyle, 2005; White and Caird, 2010). However, beyond verbal reports in in-depth 
accident studies, there is yet little concrete evidence that links change- or inattention blindness 
to real-world crashes. For example, as mentioned in section 2.1.2, looked-but-failed-to-see did 
not appear as a major crash contributing factor in the 100-car study (Dingus et al., 2006). 
 
Evidence for the self-regulatory nature of attention deployment is offered by a study by van 
der Hulst, Rothengatter and Meijman (1998) who investigated the effect of lack of preview 
and time pressure on the adoption of safety margins and responses to lead vehicle deceleration 
events. Preview was manipulated by the presence of fog and time pressure was imposed by 
the requirement to complete the route according to a fixed time schedule. Drivers not under 
time pressure increased safety margins while driving in fog while time-pressured drivers did 
not. However, time pressured drivers reacted more accurately to the lead car decelerations 
than non-time pressured drivers and thus avoided critical situations. The authors suggested 
that a key factor behind this result was that time pressured drivers compensated for the 
smaller adopted safety margins by increasing the degree of attention allocated to driving. This 
illustrates the intimate relation between attention and adaptive behaviour. If the driver is 
motivated by a certain goal, for example to reach a destination in time, perceived uncertainty 
due to reduced safety margins may be compensated for by allocating more attention to the 
driving task. However, since this generally requires effort, drivers with no such specific 
motives preferably compensate for the increased uncertainty by increasing safety margins 
(e.g., slowing down or increasing headway). 
 
In summary, existing studies have demonstrated that attention and scheduling, as well as the 
extraction of information from the driving scene, is strongly driven top-down by the current 
task goals and context. This may lead to failures in detecting unexpected, potentially safety-
relevant, events that are not relevant to the current task and/or occur in unexpected locations. 
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Drivers also self-regulate the deployment of attention based on motivation and perceived risk. 
However, these phenomena have been relatively little studied and, as also noted by Hayhoe 
(2000) and Shinoda et al. (2001), the basic mechanisms behind attention scheduling in natural 
tasks are still largely unknown. For example, how does perception of task context influence 
proactive attention scheduling in driving? Moreover, to what extent is top-down selection in 
driving associated with voluntary, conscious control and to what extent can it occur 
automatically and effortless. These issues have not been addressed experimentally. 
 
2.3 Summary and key empirical research gaps 
Although some national statistical crash databases include information on inattention-related 
factors, these statistics are subject to great uncertainty and reveals little about the specific role 
of different inattention-related factors in crashes. In-depth accident analyses, where the 
analysis of inattention-related factors is largely based on subjective reports, have consistently 
identified inattention as a major factor involved in crash causation. However, due to 
incoherent classification schemes the results are somewhat difficult to interpret. Moreover, 
these types of studies reveal little about the specific mechanisms underlying attention failures 
and how they lead to crashes. The same can be said about epidemiological studies. 
 
Naturalistic observation and driving studies have greatly enhanced our understanding of such 
mechanisms and will continue to do so as more and more data are collected. One key finding 
of existing studies is that the prevalence of attention failures increases with event severity, 
which indicates that inattention is often what makes critical events develop into crashes. 
Naturalistic driving studies have consistently demonstrated a strong relation between eyes-
off-road time and crash risk. However, purely working memory loading tasks have not been 
found to elevate risk and, in some cases, even had a protective effect.  
 
A large number of experimental dual task studies have demonstrated decrements in driving 
performance both due to visual time sharing and working memory load. Effects of visual time 
sharing are relatively well understood and typically involve increased variability in lane 
position, a compensatory increase in safety margins in terms of speed reduction and/or 
increased headway and, most importantly, severely delayed responses to critical events. 
 
However, effects of working memory load are often inconsistent between studies. While 
several studies have found that working memory load leads to delayed event detection, other 
studies indicate that this effect mainly occurs for events that are cued (e.g., by brake light 
onsets, downstream traffic events or traffic signs). Moreover, many studies have found that 
working memory load induces a reduction in lateral control variability, often accompanied by 
increased steering activity and gaze concentration towards the road. However, other studies 
found that working memory load impaired lateral control. Unlike visual tasks, working 
memory load does not consistently lead to safety margin compensation in terms of reduced 
speed or increased headway. Finally, there is an apparent discrepancy between experimental 
dual task studies and naturalistic driving studies regarding the effects of working memory 
loading tasks. In particular, delayed responses to critical events often found in experimental 
studies contrast sharply to the protective effects of working memory load that have been 
found by several recent naturalistic driving studies. 
 
Thus, in general, the mechanisms behind the effects of working memory load on driving 
performance are still not well understood and the degree to which the results from 
experimental studies generalise to the real world driving remains an open issue. 
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Compared to the vast literature on dual task interference, studies that have investigated the 
role of expectancy, proactive attention scheduling and self-regulation of attention are 
relatively scarce. Existing work in this area, in particular the car-bicycle accident analysis by 
Summala and colleagues (Summala and Räsänen, 2000) clearly show that these are key 
aspects that must be considered in order to understand the relation between attention selection 
and crashes.  
 
Based on this review, it may be concluded that the key gaps in our knowledge on the relation 
between attention, driving performance and crash risk concern (a) the effects of working 
memory load and (b) the mechanisms behind expectancy, proactive attention scheduling and 
self-regulation of attention. Moreover, the extent to which results from experimental studies 
generalise to the real world remains an open question, especially with respect to working 
memory load. Finally, due to these knowledge gaps, we do not yet have a clear understanding 
of the ultimate question that motivated the present thesis: How do attention selection failures 
cause road crashes?  
 
The following chapter provides a critical review of existing theoretical frameworks of 
attention and their potential applicability to the understanding of attention selection in natural 
driving situations. 
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3 Theories of attention and their applicability to natural 
driving 
 
So far, we have not been very precise about the meaning of “attention”, but rather used the 
term in its general common-sense meaning, expressed, for example by William James (1890):  
 
“Everybody knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and 
vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of 
thought” 
 
In this view, attention thus refers to the selection of certain environmental features or mental 
operations over others and is also strongly associated with conscious experience. As we shall 
see, this general view of attention is still widely held in contemporary attention research. 
However, the concept of attention has been notoriously hard to pin down scientifically and is 
used to refer to a broad range of phenomena. As noted by Allport (1993) and Trick and Enns, 
(2009), applied as well as basic research on attention is still strongly fragmented  with a wide 
variety of models and approaches that are often specific to the particular attentional 
phenomenon studied.  
 
One tradition, which still dominates applied human factors research, views attention selection 
as the consequence of limited information processing capacity. Such capacity limitations have 
been conceptualised as filters (Broadbent, 1958), attentional bottlenecks (Welford, 1952; 
Pashler and Johnston, 1998) or scarce resources (Kahneman, 1973; Navon and Gopher, 1979; 
Wickens, 1984). Traditionally, a distinction is often made between selective and divided 
attention. The former has been defined as the ability to select tasks, stimuli, or aspects of 
stimuli, over others (Kahneman, 1973; Wickens and McCarley, 2008). By contrast, divided 
attention refers to the parallel processing of tasks or stimuli rather than switching between 
them (Wickens and McCarley, 2008). Another type of attention is sustained attention, or 
vigilance, which refers to the effortful mobilisation of mental activity over a prolonged period 
of time (Wickens and McCarley, 2008). The link between attention, the mobilisation of effort 
and physiological arousal is emphasised by some authors, in particular Kahneman (1973). 
While most traditional models focus on the selection of information, some authors have 
emphasised the role of attention in the selection of action (Norman and Shallice, 1986; 
Allport, 1987; Neumann, 1987). In the past decades, great progress has also been made on 
understanding the neural basis of attention (e.g., Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Corbetta and 
Shulman, 2002; Cohen, Aston-Jones and Gilzenrat, 2004). 
 
This chapter provides a critical review of existing theoretical perspectives on attention with 
the main purpose to identify theories that can be used as a basis for understanding attention 
selection in natural driving situations 
 
3.1 Limited capacity models 
Since the cognitive revolution in the 1950’s and 60’s (see Gardner, 1985), information 
processing (IP) has been the dominating paradigm in cognitive science, especially in the field 
of applied human factors.  IP models generally propose that cognition proceeds in a sequence 
of information processing stages, including sensation, perception, cognition (decision and 
response selection) and action (response execution). A dominating theme in attention research 
in this tradition has been the view of attention as a limited capacity in human information 
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processing and selective attention as the consequence of such limitations. A key concern is 
how this limited capacity becomes overloaded by information, resulting in breakdowns in 
performance, especially during concurrent performance of multiple tasks. Limited capacity 
models are thus intimately linked to the dual task experimental paradigm.  
 
There is substantial debate over the nature of the limited capacity, however. One aspect of this 
debate concerns whether selection occurs early (Broadbent, 1958; Handy, Soltani and 
Mangun, 2001) or late (Moray, 1969) in an assumed information processing sequence from 
stimulus to response. Another concerns whether the limitations are best conceptualised as due 
to processing bottlenecks (Welford, 1952; Pashler and Johnston, 1998) or competition for 
shared resources (Kahneman, 1973; Navon and Gopher, 1979; Wickens, 1984, 2002). Yet 
another issue of dispute is whether capacity is limited by a single resource/bottleneck 
(Welford, 1958; Kahneman, 1973; Pashler and Johnston, 1998) or whether there are multiple 
resources, each with its own capacity limitations (Navon and Gopher, 1979; Wickens, 1984, 
2002).  
 
We will focus here on two general accounts of limited capacity that both are commonly 
applied to the understanding of attention in driving: Resource theory and central bottleneck 
models. 
 
3.1.1 Resource theory 
Resource theory is based on the idea that the limited capacity of the human information 
processing system can be viewed in terms of resources that may be allocated in gradual way 
to different tasks that demand them. Resources are intended as an abstraction relating to 
concepts such as attention, effort and capacity (Navon and Gopher, 1979). Since resources are 
scarce, there will be performance tradeoffs when two or more tasks demand the same 
resource. In dual task studies, such tradeoffs may reveal the degree of interference between 
two tasks. Kahneman (1973) proposed an influential resource-based attention model 
postulating a single, undifferentiated, resource pool, as well as more specific satellite 
structures. In Kahneman’s view, attentional resources are intimately linked to effort and 
physiological arousal, manifested, for example, in terms of pupil dilation and increased heart 
rate and skin conductance. A concept closely related to resource theory is mental workload, 
which represents the relation between the demand for resources imposed by a task and the 
ability of the operator to supply them (Wickens, 2002). 
 
Another concept that traditionally relates to the notion of resources is automaticity. Automatic 
processing relates to the everyday observation that, with practice, we are often able to perform 
tasks without effort and conscious awareness. Automatic processing has been characterised as 
a “…a fast, parallel, fairly effortless process that is not limited by short-term memory (STM) 
capacity, is not under direct subject control, and is responsible for the development of well-
developed skilled behaviors” (Schneider, Dumais and Schiffrin , 1984, p.1). By contrast, 
controlled (or control) processing can be characterised as “…a slow, generally serial, 
effortful, capacity-limited, subject-regulated processing mode that must be used to deal with 
novel or inconsistent information” (Schneider et al., 1983, p.1). According to resource theory, 
automaticity can be understood in terms of the amount of resources demanded by a task. 
Thus, in this view, controlled processes are those that require attentional resources while 
automatic processes do not require such resources.  
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Single resource theory, in its strongest form, predicts that dual task interference is solely 
determined by the degree to which the added demands of the tasks exceed available resources 
supplied by a single resource pool. However, a large number of dual tasks studies have 
yielded results inconsistent with this prediction. In particular, it has been demonstrated that 
interference is often stronger between structurally similar tasks, for example tasks demanding 
the same sensory modality, than for dissimilar tasks. Moreover, some tasks could be 
performed with little or no interference at all (see e.g. Wickens, 1984, for a review). Navon 
and Gopher (1979) and Wickens (1984) suggested that such results are better accounted for 
by the postulation of multiple resources. 
 
Today, Multiple Resource Theory (MRT; Wickens, 1984, 2002; Wickens and McCarley, 
2008) has become the dominating approach to applied attention research in the human factors 
community. MRT originally proposed a set of multiple resources that can be described along 
three dimensions: (1) processing stages (perception, cognition, responding), (2) codes (spatial, 
verbal) and (3) modalities (visual, auditory). More recently, a fourth dimension, visual 
processing (focal, ambient), nested within the visual modality, has been added (Wickens, 
2002). The model makes the general prediction that dual task interference will be strongest 
when two tasks demand overlapping resources. For tasks demanding separate resources, little 
or no interference is predicted.  
 
3.1.2 Central bottleneck models 
As just described, resource theory suggests a general conceptualisation of how task 
performance depends on limited capacity. However, it does not address in detail how capacity 
is limited, for example, whether dual tasks are performed in parallel or switched between in a 
serial manner. The central bottleneck hypothesis (Welford (1952; Pashler and Johnston, 1998) 
suggests a more specific account of limited capacity. As most IP models, central bottleneck 
models assumes that human information processing proceeds in distinct stages. Pashler and 
Johnson (1998) suggest three main stages: stimulus processing, central processing and 
response-related processing. In this view, “attention” refers to voluntary processes and 
“attentional limitations” to “central” limitations, excluding peripheral limitations such as the 
impossibility to fixate two spatially separated objects at the same time (Pashler and Johnston, 
1998). By contrast to resource theory, capacity limitations are viewed in terms of a central 
bottleneck that cannot be shared. Hence, dual task performance necessarily requires serial 
operation characterised by switching and buffering, similar to the central processing unit of a 
digital computer. However, it is also assumed that stimulus processing and response execution 
may, at least to some extent, be performed in parallel. Hence, according to this account, 
attentional limitations should mainly occur at the central, response selection, stage. The 
central bottleneck model has been applied in the driving domain by Levy, Pashler and Boer 
(2006) who applied the classical psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm in a lead 
vehicle braking scenario. The findings generally replicated PRP effects typically found in 
laboratory tasks (see Pashler and Johnston, 1998). 
 
The central bottleneck idea is also central in the more general account of multitasking 
proposed by Salvucci and Taatgen (2008), known as the threaded cognition model, which has 
been applied in the driving context by Salvucci and Beltowska (2008). This computational 
model was developed within the general ACT-R (Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational) 
framework which models cognition and behaviour in terms of production rules that 
implement empirically known psychological constrains (Anderson et al., 2004). While the 
threaded cognition model assumes a variety of perceptual, cognitive and motor processing 
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resources (this aspect of the model is thus in line with multiple resource theory, Wickens, 
1984, 2002), it also postulates the existence of a central processing bottleneck, a central 
procedural resource, which maps between sensory and motor processes and can only be 
deployed serially. The model also accounts for visual time sharing in terms of a visual 
resource that controls eye movements, recruited by the procedural resource. Simulations 
based on the model have yielded detailed predictions of performance impairments for 
different task combinations. For example, Salvucci and Taatgen (2008) demonstrated that the 
model accurately predicted effects of phone dialling on lane keeping performance. The model 
also predicts that working memory loading tasks, due to competition for the procedural 
resource, should lead to delayed braking responses, less frequent steering updates and, as a 
result, less accurate lane keeping (Salvucci and Taatgen, 2008). These predictions were tested 
in a simulator study by Salvucci and Beltowska (2008) who, as reviewed in Section 2.2.2, 
indeed found that working memory load lead to delayed responses and impaired lane keeping 
performance. However, at least for lane keeping, both the prediction and the empirical result 
contradicts a large number of other studies that rather found reduced lane keeping variability 
and increased steering activity due to working memory load. 
 
Thus, although limited capacity models have been successfully demonstrated to account for 
certain aspects of dual task performance, some predictions seem to be contradicted by existing 
empirical results. However, more importantly, limited capacity models are mainly applicable 
to experimental dual task settings and have little to say about key aspects in real world driving 
such as the role of expectancy, self-regulation of attention and proactive attention scheduling 
reviewed in Section 2.2.3.. Hence, limited capacity models seem insufficient for a full account 
of attention selection in natural driving.  
 
3.2 Beyond limited capacity: Expectancy, proactive attention 
scheduling and self-regulation 
 
This section reviews models in the basic attention literature that potentially accounts for 
aspects of attention selection in driving not confined to dual task settings, in particular the 
phenomena reviewed in Section 2.2.3 relating to expectancy, proactive attention scheduling 
and self-regulation of attention and in natural driving situations. 
 
3.2.1 Top-down and bottom-up selection 
As demonstrated, for example, by the analysis of car-bicycle accidents by Summala and 
colleagues, reviewed in section 2.1.2, attention selection in natural driving situations is driven 
top-down by task goals and expectations as well as bottom-up by stimulus input. In the past 
decade, the distinction between top-down and bottom-up selection has become a cornerstone 
in basic attention research. Related terms include endogenous versus exogenous orienting 
(Posner, 1980) and goal-directed versus stimulus-driven selection (Corbetta and Shulman, 
2002). In the following, we will consistently use the top-down/bottom-up terminology to 
avoid confusion. 
 
Laboratory studies using the cueing paradigm (Posner, 1980) have clearly demonstrated the 
distinct roles of top-down and bottom-up attention orienting. Jonides (1981) demonstrated 
that working memory load mainly affected central (top-down) cueing but leaving peripheral 
(bottom-up) cueing largely unaffected. Such results have led to the influential idea that top-
 21
down attention orienting is voluntary, effortful, and thus controlled, while bottom-up attention 
orienting is reflexive and automatic. 
 
During the past decades, the understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying top-down 
and bottom-up attention selection has also been greatly enhanced. One particularly influential 
account is the biased competition hypothesis which views attention as an emergent property 
of multiple neural mechanisms, which resolve neural competition based on bottom-up and 
top-down biases (Desimone and Duncan, 1995). According to the biased competition 
hypothesis, top-down and bottom-up biases will have the effect of enhancing the certain 
neural representations while suppressing competing representations. This idea has been 
strongly supported by neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies in monkeys and humans 
(e.g., Chelazzi et al., 1993; Kastner et al., 1998, 1999).  
 
Recent studies have also demonstrated the strong role of emotion in biasing attention 
selection (see reviews in Pessoa, 2008; Phelps, 2006; Vuilleumier, 2005). Evidence suggests 
that this biasing mechanism works according to similar principles as “normal” biased 
competition (Vuilleumier, 2005).  
 
In the original formulation if the biased competition hypothesis (Desimone and Duncan, 
1995), it was suggested that the top-down bias originated from the pre-frontal cortex (PFC). 
However, the detailed function of the PFC in generating this bias was left unspecified. An 
extension of the model, featuring a more detailed account of PFC function, is offered by 
Miller and Cohen (2001), called Guided Activation Theory. According this model, the PFC 
serves to maintain activity of neural patterns representing goals and the means to achieve 
them. The key role of PFC bias is to “provide bias signals to other brain structures with the 
net effect to guide the flow of activity along neural pathways that establish the proper 
mappings between inputs, internal states, and outputs needed to perform a given task” (Miller 
and Cohen, 2001, p 167). More specifically, the bias is needed to select a task relevant, but 
weak, neural pathway over an inherently stronger one. Repeated selection of a pathway 
strengthens it so that it eventually does not require bias from the PFC to be activated, which 
leads to increasingly automatic performance. The model thus suggests that automaticity may 
be considered in terms of the strength of neural pathways (an idea originally formulated by 
Cohen, Dunbar and McClelland, 1990). In terms of this model, dual task interference could be 
understood in terms of the degree of overlap between these pathways. Miller and Cohen refer 
to the attentional biasing function of the PFC as cognitive control. Cognitive control thus 
enables behavioural flexibility in non-routine situations by the selection of weak, but task 
relevant, pathways over stronger pathways representing automatic, habitual, behaviours.  
 
There is also a general consensus that working memory is closely associated with top-down 
attention selection (Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Corbetta and Shulman, 2002), and, more 
specifically, with cognitive control (Miller and Cohen, 2001). Cognitive control implements 
working memory by maintaining activation of task, or goal, relevant representations in the 
absence of stimulus input (Miller and Cohen, 2001) 
 
The distinction between top-down and bottom-up selection is clearly of key importance for 
understanding attention selection in driving, especially for conceptualising the roles of 
expectancy and stimulus driven reactions to critical hazards (e.g., Summala and Räsänen, 
2000; Theeuwes, 1996). Moreover, the biased competition hypothesis and the guided 
activation theory offer models of the neurobiological principles of attention selection and 
automaticity which may be useful as the basis for more applied models of attention in driving. 
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However, these models are still mainly concerned with specific laboratory tasks and fail to 
account for many of the key phenomena reviewed in Section 2.2.3, in particular the self-
regulation of attention and dynamic attention scheduling in natural driving situations. 
 
Moreover, as mentioned above, a common implicit assumption in these models is that that 
top-down selection is always controlled while bottom-up selection is always automatic. 
However, intuitively, selection of information and actions selection in driving and other 
everyday activities is often habitual and unconscious, yet top-down driven by expectations 
and task goals. Thus, a model of attention selection in driving should account for this type of 
habitual top-down selection. This topic is further addressed in the following section. 
 
3.2.2 Trick and Enns’ 2-dimensional framework 
Trick and Enns (2009; see also Trick et al., 2004) have proposed a conceptual framework 
specifically intended to account for attention selection in driving. As just mentioned, many 
existing attention models tend to associate top-down selection with controlled performance 
and bottom-up selection with automatic performance. Trick and Enns rather suggest that 
controlled/automatic and top-down/bottom-up 7  dichotomies should be treated as separate 
dimensions. 
 
Tricks and Enns suggest two general modes of automatic processing, reflex and habit which 
relate to bottom-up and top-down selection respectively. The former refers to automatic 
responses such as visual orienting to sudden luminance onsets or looming, while habit relates 
to goal-directed behaviours that, through practice, have become effortless and unconscious. 
This includes basic driving skills that distinguish experienced from novice drivers, such as 
allocating attention in advance towards the most relevant aspects of a road scene. However, 
Trick and Enns (2009) also suggest that habits may be detrimental for road safety when they 
are imported into new situations that require different behaviours.  
 
The authors further suggest two forms of controlled processing: deliberation (top-down) and 
exploration (bottom-up). In driving, deliberation occurs when “(a) conditions are challenging 
(low visibility, heavy traffic, unexpected events, unfamiliar environments) (b) when 
individuals perform unfamiliar activities or combinations of activities (dual tasks) that require 
an action plan to be constructed on-line using moment-to-moment feedback from the 
environment; (c) when individuals are acting strategically, and not simply reacting to events 
in the immediate environment; (d) when individuals react to symbolic information that must 
be interpreted to be acted upon; and (e) when maladaptive habits and reflexes must be 
monitored and overcome.” (Trick and Enns, 2009, p. 70). Deliberation hence corresponds to 
the traditional notion of top-down attention selection. 
 
The remaining category, exploration refers to conscious exploration of the environment which 
is not driven by specific goals. This includes, for example, drivers in non-demanding 
conditions scanning the environment to explore roadside objects such as advertisement, trees 
etc. (Hills, 1980). These four modes of attention selection are illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
                                                 
7
 Trick and Enns use the terms endogenous/exogenous terminology rather than top-down/ bottom-up and argue 
that these two concepts have a slightly different meaning (see Trick et al., 2004). However, for simplicity, we 
retain the top-down/bottom-up terminology here. 
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Figure 3 Trick and Enns’ 2-dimensional framework for attention selection in driving (adopted from 
Trick and Enns, 2009) 
 
This framework provides a useful starting point for approaching many of the empirical 
phenomena reviewed in Chapter 2. In particular, it accounts for the notion of skilled, habitual, 
yet top-down driven, attention selection which is not captured by standard models of top-
down and bottom-up selection (or by limited capacity models). However, as a general 
conceptual framework, rather than a specific model, it does not yield specific testable 
predictions. Moreover, the framework does not specifically address aspects related to 
dynamic attention scheduling in natural tasks or the self-regulation of attention. These topics 
are addressed in the following two sections. 
 
3.2.3 Self-regulation of attentional effort 
As illustrated, for example, by the study by van der Hulst et al. (1998) reviewed in Section 
2.2.3, drivers manage attention in a self-regulatory fashion, driven, on the one hand, by the 
desire to accomplish task goals and, on the other, by the need to maintain acceptable safety 
margins. Thus, from this perspective, attention selection may be viewed as a form of adaptive 
behaviour. Several recent models in the general driver behaviour literature suggest that 
adaptive behaviour occurs as the result of a balance between excitatory and inhibitory forces. 
Excitatory forces may involve task goals such as the desire to arrive to a destination in time 
(as in van der Hulst et al., 1998) or to enter a destination into the navigation system. However, 
such goals need to be balanced against the need to maintain safe driving and respect traffic 
rules, which represent inhibitory forces. The zero-risk theory, originally developed by 
Näätänen & Summala (1976), suggested that drivers normally regulate their behaviour to 
maintain the subjectively perceived risk at a zero level. In a more recent development of this 
model, partly based on Gibson and Crooks (1938), Summala (2007) proposed the concept of a 
safety zone, the boundary of which represents when a crash becomes inevitable, for example, 
the speed at which a vehicle starts to skid or roll over in a curve, or the minimum time-to-
collision for which it is possible to avoid a crash by braking. Furthermore, Summala (2007) 
suggested that concept of risk in the zero-risk theory may be substituted for discomfort. Thus, 
according to this model, the driver strives to maintain a state of zero discomfort. The 
difference between this comfort zone boundary and the safety zone boundary represents the 
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safety margin selected by the driver. Discomfort includes feelings of immediate risk or threat 
(e.g., in a critical traffic situation), but is also associated with the mobilization of effort to 
cope with excessive task demands (Hockey, 1997). Thus, in this view, adaptive driver 
behaviour occurs as the result of the desire to accomplish task goals while remaining in the 
comfort zone. When the driver perceives a feeling of discomfort, for example due to reduced 
perception of surrounding traffic when engaged in visual time sharing, she will compensate 
by slowing down and/or increasing headway in order to remain in the comfort zone. However, 
if strongly motivated to accomplish the task, she may also invest addition attentional effort to 
cope with the increased demand. The general idea that adaptive behaviour is governed by 
emotions and feelings has also been developed by Fuller (2007) and Vaa (2007). 
 
However, these general driver behaviour models have not addressed the role of attention 
specifically. Lee, Regan and Young (2009) outlined a control-theoretic view on driver 
distraction which builds on similar principles. The authors suggest that drivers actively 
control their attention allocation strategies at three levels: operational, tactical and strategic 
(these general levels of driving control were originally proposed by Michon, 1985). 
Furthermore, at each level, control may be reactive (based on feedback), proactive (based on 
anticipation) or adaptive (involving adjustments of the general goal state). At the operational 
level drivers control the basic resource investments for driving and secondary tasks. At the 
tactical level, they control task timing, while control at the strategic level concerns the general 
exposure to potentially demanding situations. They further suggest that driver distraction can 
be understood as a breakdown in control at any of these levels and that a failure at one level 
may propagate to other levels. For example, a failure at the strategic level to control the 
general task demand may cause problems in the temporal scheduling between driving and a 
secondary task which, in turn, may lead to excessive demands for visual resources and a 
breakdown in operational control.  
 
Another control theoretic model of the self-regulation of attention and effort has been 
developed by Hockey (e.g., 1997). The basic idea behind this model is that maintenance of 
performance stability under demanding conditions is a self-regulatory process that manages 
the mobilisation of mental effort. The mobilisation of effort is aversive and thus associated 
with a cost. In the face of increasing task demand, an operator may choose to protect task 
performance by investing effort (with an increase in cost) or accept a reduction in 
performance (at no cost). Hence, according to the model, the self-regulation of attentional 
effort is based on continuous cost-benefit decisions.  
 
A more neurobiologically based model along the same lines is offered by Botvinick et al. 
(2001; see also Botvinick, 2007), which represents an extention of the guided activation 
theory reviewed above (Miller and Cohen, 2001). Botvinick et al. suggest that the recruitment 
of cognitive control is driven by the monitoring of conflicts between neural pathways in a 
self-regulating fashion, governed mainly by the anterior cingulated cortex (ACC). Thus, when 
the ACC detects a conflict between ongoing tasks, it signals to the pre-frontal cortex that 
cognitive control is needed to resolve it. A related account is offered by Aston-Jones and 
Cohen (2005), who further suggest a key role of global arousal modulation, originating in the 
brainstem, in the self-regulatory recruitment of cognitive control. A general synthesis of the 
attention models developed by Cohen and colleagues can be found in Cohen et al. (2004). 
 
The models reviewed in this Section offer a strong theoretical basis for understanding the self-
regulatory aspects of attention deployment in natural driving situations. These models may 
also explain compensatory behaviours observed in dual task studies, such as slowing down 
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while visually time sharing with a secondary task, phenomena which are seldom addressed by 
limited capacity models. However, they do not specifically account for the type of dynamic 
scheduling of attention in natural driving situations exemplified by Shinoda et al. (2001; see 
Section 2.2.3). This topic is addressed in the following section. 
 
3.2.4 Attention scheduling in natural tasks 
In naturalistic driving situations, driving itself may be viewed as a multitasking activity where 
the driver continuously has to select the right information at the right time. As reviewed in 
Section 2.2.3, the extraction of information from a scene is strongly task specific and may be 
understood as the application of specific visual routines (Hayhoe, 2000). The top-down driven 
scheduling of such visual routines, generally involving eye movements, was termed the 
scheduling problem by Hayhoe (2000). From a more general perspective, the scheduling 
problem also applies to action and, in natural tasks, perception and action are intimately 
linked (e.g., Allport, 1987; Neumann, 1987). Indeed, the movement of the eyes towards an 
object in order to apply a visual routine could itself be considered an action. 
 
A model of visual routines, applied to the automatic control of a simulated vehicle, was 
developed by Salgian and Ballard (1998). In this model, visual routines (for traffic light 
detection, vehicle detection, looming detection etc.) were linked to more general behaviours 
such as car following, traffic light behaviours, obstacle avoidance etc.). However, this model 
did not implement a realistic solution to the scheduling problem (Hayhoe, 2000). 
 
A more elaborated computational model of context-driven visual allocation and action 
selection, based on similar ideas, was developed by Sprague and Ballard (2003) and 
implemented to control a virtual human with the task to collect litter in a simulated urban 
environment. Basic sensory-motor primitives were conceptualised in terms of a set of 
microbehaviours such as pick up object or look for crosswalk. These were arbitrated by means 
of value functions that represented the outcome value (reward) or loss of different 
microbehaviours in a specific situation. Thus, at each time step, the behaviour with the 
greatest expected value (or the least expected loss) was selected. These value functions were 
learned through experience by means of a reinforcement learning algorithm. Finally, the set of 
behaviours applicable in a certain situation was determined by a general representation of task 
context.  
 
A conceptual model of the role of attention in action scheduling was proposed by Norman and 
Shallice (1986), and later implemented computationally by Cooper and Shallice, (2000) (see 
also Cooper et al., 2005). This model proposes two complementary mechanisms for selection 
and control of attention for action. The first mechanism, which deals with routine selection, is 
termed contention scheduling and acts through mutual lateral competition between schemata 
which implement routine actions at different levels of abstraction. Schemata can be activated 
bottom-up by triggers, which receive input from the perceptual system. The second 
mechanism, called the supervisory attentional system (SAS), controls contention scheduling 
according to current goals and task demand by means of top-down biasing of schemata 
representing willed acts. The deployment of the SAS is assumed to require effort and is 
accessible to conscious awareness. The Norman and Shallice (1986) model is in many 
respects similar to the guided activation model of Miller and Cohen (2001) described above, 
where the SAS plays a similar role as cognitive control in the model of Miller and Cohen 
(2001). These models also converge on the view that basic actions are governed by parallel 
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sensory-motor control structures (schemata or neural pathways) that may interfere through 
lateral inhibition, or “cross-talk” (see also Allport, 1993).  
 
A common feature in the models reviewed so far in this section is the notion of functional 
units for perception and/or action control, such as “visual routines”, “behaviours” or 
“schemata”, which compete for being selected. Selection is influenced bottom-up by stimulus 
input and top-down by a representation of the task context (Salgian and Ballard, 1998; 
Sprague and Ballard, 2003) or by an “executive” system initiating willed acts (Norman and 
Shallice, 1986). It should be noted that the precise definition of “schemata” or “behaviours” 
differs somewhat between authors. However, in general these can be viewed as a functional 
units of action control (Pezzulo, 2007) which may refer to basic motor actions such as “pick-
up”, routine action sequences such as “add milk from carton” or more general tasks such as 
“prepare instant coffee” (see Cooper and Shallice, 2000). As suggested by Arbib (1991), the 
schema concept offers an intermediate level of action representation that can be related to 
brain theory as well as cognitive modelling and robotics. 
 
Finally, largely in parallel to the models reviewed above, Wickens and colleagues (e.g., 
Wickens and McCarley, 2008; Wickens and Horrey, 2009) have proposed a computational 
model of visual scanning known as SEEV. The model computes the probability that foveal 
vision is allocated to a particular area of interest in terms of the weighted sum of four key 
factors: Saliency, Effort, Expectancy and Value. Here, salience refers mainly to physical 
stimulus properties such as contrast and visual transients and effort refers to the energetic 
costs of allocating attention to a certain target area. These are viewed as bottom-up influences 
on visual scanning. By contrast, expectancy and value are viewed as top-down factors. 
Expectancy is defined in terms of the expected information content associated with an area of 
interest, as determined by event frequency (bandwidth) and contextual cues. Finally, value 
refers to the subjective value, or utility, in sampling an area of interest (or the loss of ignoring 
it). The probability of fixating an area is thus given by a trade-off between the positive 
influence of saliency, expectancy and value and the negative influence of effort. Horrey, et al. 
(2006) applied a simplified version of the model (with only the top-down components, 
expectancy and value, included) to the prediction of visual time sharing patterns in a driving 
simulator study, and found good model fits to human data.   
 
The models reviewed in this section are all useful starting points for conceptualising attention 
scheduling in natural tasks such as driving, although they differ somewhat in scope. SEEV is 
essentially a model of visual scanning and does not account for other attentional phenomena.  
By contrast, Norman and Shallice’s (1986) model is broader in scope and, in addition to 
action scheduling, addresses other key aspects of attention discussed in this chapter such as 
automaticity and top-down/bottom-up selection as well as dual task interference. It is also 
largely compatible with the more neurobiologically based guided activation theory reviewed 
above (Miller and Cohen, 2001), but described on a more abstract level. Sprague and Ballard 
(2003) and the SEEV model both incorporate the notion of value as a key factor determining 
the allocation of visual attention. However, none of these models account for the self-
regulatory aspects of attention reviewed in the previous section.  
 
Rather surprisingly, with the exception of SEEV, and the more engineering-oriented model of 
Salgian and Ballard (1998), the models reviewed in this section have not, to the knowledge of 
the author, been applied in the driving domain. 
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3.3 Summary 
This Chapter reviewed existing models of attention and discussed to what extent they are 
applicable to the understanding the relation between attention, performance and crash risk in 
natural driving. The review shows, as previously noted by Allport (1993) and Trick and Enns 
(2009), that the field of attention research is strongly fragmented and that no comprehensive 
model of attention exists today. 
 
Most existing attention models that have been applied in the driving domain are based on the 
concept of limited capacity. However, as argued above, limited capacity models are severely 
limited in their scope and mainly apply in experimental dual task situations. In particular, they 
do not account for key issues in real-world driving such as expectancy, dynamic attention 
scheduling and the self-regulation of attention.  
 
Contemporary basic research on attention offers detailed, often neurobiologically based, 
models of specific laboratory phenomena. A key focus of this research has been to elucidate 
basic mechanisms behind top-down and bottom-up selection, cognitive control and 
automaticity. While these models are strongly relevant to the understanding of attention 
selection in driving, they are generally too specific to be directly applicable in the driving 
domain. In particular, as pointed out by Trick and Enns (2009), these models often conflate 
the top-down/bottom-up and controlled/automatic dimensions. While top-down selection in 
laboratory tasks is probably most often controlled, everyday experience suggests that habitual 
top-down selection is ubiquitous in driving and thus need to be accounted for by driver 
attention models. 
 
In general, the framework by Trick and Enns (2009), originally outlined in Trick et al. (2004), 
offers a very useful starting point for the study of attention in driving. However, the 
framework does not specifically address dynamic aspects of attention such as self-regulation 
and dynamic attention scheduling. Relatively few existing models have addressed these 
aspects. With respect to self-regulation of attention, models of adaptive behaviour in the 
general driver behaviour literature, as well as the control-theoretic accounts of Lee et al. 
(2009) and Hockey (1997), may serve as starting points. Botvinick et al. (2001) and Aston-
Jones and Cohen (2005) offer neurobiological accounts of attentional self-regulation. A rare 
example of a high-level synthesis of neurobiological models of attention, including selection 
mechanisms, cognitive control, automaticity and attentional self-regulation can be found in 
Cohen et al. (2004). 
 
Finally, models of attention scheduling include the SEEV model, which, however, only 
accounts for visual scanning. Other approaches, in particular the attention-to-action model 
proposed by Norman and Shallice (1986), account for attention and action scheduling in terms 
of the selection of mutually competing schemata, or related concepts such as “behaviours” or 
“routines” (Salgian and Ballard, 1998; Sprague and Ballard, 2003). Such models may also 
account for other key phenomena, including dual task interference. Still, they have so far not 
been applied in the driving domain. Nevertheless, they seem to be a good starting point for the 
development of a general model of attention selection in natural driving. 
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4  Specific aims 
 
As stated in Section 1.2, the general aim of the present thesis is to obtain an improved 
understanding of the relation between attention, performance and crash risk in driving. 
Chapter 2 reviewed related empirical work and identified a number of outstanding research 
gaps, in particular regarding the effects of working memory load on driving and the basic 
mechanisms underlying expectancy, proactive attention scheduling and self-regulation of 
attention. Chapter 3 reviewed existing theories of attention and discussed their applicability in 
the driving domain and concluded that traditional limited capacity models fail to account for 
key aspects relevant for attention selection in natural driving situations. While some 
contemporary attention models developed in basic research do address such aspects but are 
often too specific to be directly applicable in the driving domain. 
 
Based on these reviews, the following specific aims of the present thesis have been defined. 
 
1. Develop a general conceptual model of attention selection in driving able to account 
for expectancy, dynamic attention scheduling and attentional self-regulation in natural 
driving, but also dual task interference (Paper IV, V) 
2. Obtain a better understanding of the effects of working memory load on driving 
performance (Paper I, II, III).  
3. Obtain a better understanding of the key mechanisms behind expectancy and dynamic 
attention scheduling (Paper II, III) 
4. Clarify to what extent results from experimental studies generalise to the real world 
(Paper II, III, IV) 
5. Define a general conceptualisation of how attention selection failures cause road 
crashes (Paper V) 
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5 Summary of papers 
This chapter provides summaries of the papers included in this thesis. Paper I represents a 
broad investigation of the effects of visual time sharing and working memory load on driving 
performance. Paper II focuses more specifically on the effects of working memory load and 
repeated event exposure on braking responses in a lead vehicle braking scenario. A key goal 
of this study was to investigate how working memory load affected top-down attention 
selection driven by expectancies to the repeated events. Paper III follows up on the results 
from Paper I and Paper II with the general goal to investigate possible reasons for existing 
inconsistencies regarding the effect of working memory load on driving performance. A 
further specific objective was to examine more in detail how top-down attention scheduling is 
affected by working memory load. 
 
Paper IV outlines a general framework for understanding adaptive driver behaviour which 
served as the starting point for the more specific model of attention selection in driving 
developed in Paper V. 
 
5.1 Paper I: Effects of visual and cognitive load in real and simulated 
motorway driving 
 
This paper reports from three parallel, but closely coordinated, studies, two of which were 
conducted in driving simulators and one in the field using an instrumented vehicle. The 
general objective was to investigate systematically the effects of visual time sharing and 
working memory load 8  on driving performance, behaviour and physiological state. The 
experiments were conducted as part of a more general set of coordinated studies within EU-
funded HASTE project, reported in Östlund et al. (2004). 
 
5.1.1 Method 
Data were collected from three experimental settings: (1) a fixed base simulator, (2) an 
advanced moving base simulator and (3) an instrumented vehicle driven in real traffic. A 
common experimental methodology was applied and, as far as possible, the same scenarios 
and dependent measures were included in all three experiments. In total, 120 subjects 
participated, 48 in each of the simulator studies and 24 in the field study. 
 
Two secondary tasks were used in all three sub-studies, one visual and one auditory/cognitive 
(working memory loading) task. The visual task involved visual search for a target arrow 
among distractor arrows on a LCD touch display positioned over the centre console. The 
difficulty was varied at three levels by altering the orientation of the non-target arrows and the 
size of the array The working memory task required the subject to keep an updated count of a 
number of target sounds, presented in sequence among non-target sounds. The difficulty was 
manipulated at three levels by varying the number of target sounds.  
 
The effects of performing the visual and the working memory task were assessed in terms of  
a variety of dependent variables which can grouped into the following general categories: (1) 
                                                 
8
 In Paper I the term cognitive load, rather than working memory load, is used, as this was the common 
terminology used in the HASTE project. However, in order to be consistent with the rest of the thesis, the latter 
term is used in this summary. 
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longitudinal vehicle control, (2) lateral vehicle control, (3) physiological signals, (4) eye 
movements and (5) self-reported driving performance measures. In addition, secondary task 
performance was assessed in non-driving (static) as well as driving (dynamic) conditions. 
 
5.1.2 Results 
 
Effects of the visual task 
The effects of the visual task were generally in line with previous studies (reviewed in Section 
2.2.1). Visual time sharing led to significantly increased lane keeping variability (in terms of 
increased standard deviation of lane position), but only in the fixed-base simulator. However, 
a strong tendency in the same direction was also obtained in the moving-base simulator. No 
effect on lane keeping was found in the field. Also, visual time sharing led to significantly 
increased frequency of steering wheel reversals increased in all three sub-studies. The speed 
was significantly reduced in all three settings while mean skin conductance and heart rate 
increased as a result of the visual task. 
 
Effects of the working memory task 
The effects of the working memory task contrasted strongly to the effects of the visual task. 
Both simulator studies found that the working memory load induced significantly reduced 
lane keeping variability. The results from the fixed-based simulator for standard deviation of 
lane position are shown in Figure 4. A tendency for reduced lane keeping variability was also 
present in the field, but the effect was not statistically significant. In general, this effect was 
very robust and replicated in most of the parallel HASTE experiments (see Östlund et al., 
2004). Steering wheel reversal rate increased significantly in the field but not in the 
simulators. The working memory task also induced a significant reduction in standard 
deviation of gaze angle, indicating a concentration of gaze to the road centre. An effect on 
physiological measures (increased heart rate) was only found in the field. No effects on speed 
were found for the working memory task in any of the settings. 
 
 
Figure 4 Reduction of lane keeping variability, measured in terms of standard deviation of lane 
position (st_lp), due to working memory load in the fixed base simulator (BL=baseline, SLv1-3=the 
three difficulty levels of the cognitive task. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.) 
 
5.1.3 Discussion 
The key finding of this study was the markedly different effects of the visual and the working 
memory task. Visual time sharing induces an intermittent control strategy, where the driver 
strives to maintain acceptable lane keeping performance by means of more frequent steering 
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corrections and a compensatory reduction of speed. By contrast, working memory load leads 
to a gaze concentration towards the road centre, reduced lane keeping variability but no speed 
reduction. Both tasks led to increased steering activity, but probably for different reasons. In 
the case of visual time sharing, the steering manoeuvres are performed in order to correct for 
heading errors while for the working memory task, it was suggested that the increased 
steering frequency occurred either as a side effect of gaze concentration or due to an effort to 
increase lateral safety margins. In general, these results showed that dual task interference in 
driving is a multi-faceted phenomenon and cannot be captured by single constructs such as, 
for instance, “workload”. 
 
 
5.2 Paper II: Effects of working memory load and repeated scenario 
exposure on emergency braking performance 
 
While Paper I addressed a broad range of effects of visual time sharing and working memory 
load, it did not examine responses to critical events. The general objective of this study was to 
investigate the role of top-down and bottom-up attention selection mechanisms in responses 
to critical events, and how these are affected by working memory load  A further objective 
was to address the generalisability of the results from experimental studies to real-world 
settings. 
 
Several experimental studies have found delayed braking responses to lead vehicle braking 
events during concurrent performance of working memory (WM) loading tasks, such as 
hands-free phone conversation (see Section 2.2.2). However, one potential issue with these 
studies is the use of repeated, and hence somewhat expected, braking events.  
 
Responses to expected events could be regarded as largely top-down driven, while responses 
to unexpected events should be driven bottom-up. Laboratory studies have found that working 
memory load affects impairs top-down selection more than bottom-up selection (e.g., Jonides, 
1981). In line with this, driving studies have found that working memory load specifically 
affected responses to cued events (which should be top-down driven) but had no effect when 
the cues were removed (in which case selection should be driven bottom-up; Muttart et al., 
2007; Baumann et al., 2008). Based on the assumption that working memory load only affects 
top-down selection, one would expect a working memory loading task to interfere more with 
responses to expected, top-down driven, than with unexpected, bottom-up driven, events. It 
follows that responses to repeated, expected, events in experimental studies may not be 
representative of responses to critical events in naturalistic settings, which are generally 
unexpected. 
 
Thus, when the critical events are repeated, one would expect an interaction between working 
memory and repeated exposure such that the effect of working memory load increases with 
repeated exposure. The specific objective of this study was to test this hypothesis. 
 
5.2.1 Method 
Forty participants, 20 women and 20 men, participated in the study. A critical lead vehicle 
braking scenario was implemented in a fixed-based simulator and repeated six times, 
intermingled with catch trials. Care was taken to ensure that the first event was truly 
unexpected to the subjects. The working memory task was to count down in decrements of 7 
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from a given, randomly selected, three-digit number. The independent variables were working 
memory load (varied between groups) and repeated scenario exposure (varied within groups). 
The dependent variables were accelerator release time and accelerator-to-brake movement 
time. 
 
5.2.2 Results and discussion 
Accelerator pedal release times were strongly reduced with repeated scenario exposure. The 
main reduction occurred between the first and the second exposure with a difference of 374 
ms. Working memory load delayed responses with a small but significant amount (178 ms). 
However, contrary to our hypothesis, the two factors did not interact. There were no effects 
on accelerator-to-brake pedal movement time. The results are shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5 Effects of working memory load on accelerator release time and accelerator-to-brake 
movement time across exposures (standard deviation within parentheses). Data from exposure 4 were 
missing due to a technical error. 
 
The results showed (a) that that working memory loaded participants responded slower than 
the baseline (non-loaded) group also for the first, unexpected event and (b) that the loaded 
participants were no more impaired than the baseline participants in developing faster 
responses with repeated exposure.  
 
The first observation implies that working memory load may also affect bottom-up selection. 
In reconsidering the original hypothesis, it was suggested that this may be due to the fact that 
subjects in this study responded mainly to the brake light onset rather than to looming cues. In 
the real world, brake light onsets mainly function as predictive cues rather than triggering 
braking responses directly. By contrast, strong looming cues invariably trigger avoidance 
responses. Hence, speeded responses to brake lights may require some cognitive mechanism 
that is shared with working memory load and thus affects responses also in surprising 
 33
situations, which may explain the observed delay due to working memory load for the first 
exposure to the event. This implies that working memory load should not affect responses to 
looming cues in unexpected situations, an issue addressed in Paper III. 
 
The second observation implies that at least some forms of top-down selection seem to be 
unaffected by working memory load. It was suggested that this mechanism may be related to 
the contextual cueing phenomenon studied by Chun and Jiang (1998; 1999). These authors 
found that that implicit learning of co-varying static or dynamic contextual patterns in visual 
scenes may implicitly (unconsciously) guide top-down responses to subsequent events. 
 
These results strongly question the traditional assumption that top-down selection is always a 
voluntary, effortful, process associated with working memory while bottom-up selection is 
always automatic. Rather, at least some forms of top-down selection may occur more 
automatically while bottom-up selection may sometimes rely on cognitive mechanisms that 
are also involved in working memory. These results thus yielded important constraints for the 
development of the attention selection model presented in Paper V and led to an alternative 
hypothesis examined in Paper III. 
 
 
5.3 Paper III: Effects of working memory load on controlled and 
automatic driving performance 
 
Existing studies on the effects of working memory load on driving performance have yielded 
apparently inconsistent results. This holds for event detection, lateral control as well as 
longitudinal control measures (see section 2.2.2). The basic reasons for these inconsistencies 
are not well understood. The general objective of this paper was to examine a possible 
resolution to this dilemma: that working memory load mainly affects controlled but not 
automatic aspects of driving performance. 
 
Controlled performance is associated with effort and conscious awareness while automatic 
performance is effortless and unconscious. As discussed above, a commonly held view is that 
top-down selection is generally controlled while bottom-up selection is automatic. This was 
the basis for the hypothesis tested in Paper II: Loading working memory, which is generally 
believed to rely on controlled performance, should mainly affect top-down selection but leave 
bottom-up selection unaffected. However, the results from Paper II, contrary to this 
hypothesis, rather suggested that top-down selection may sometimes run automatically while 
bottom-up selection may sometimes be controlled. Hence, top-down versus bottom-up 
selection and controlled versus automatic performance are best viewed as separate 
dimensions, as suggested by Trick and Enns (2009; see Section 3.2.2). 
  
Based on Trick and Enns’ framework, it was hypothesised that working memory load should 
selectively affect exploration and deliberation (controlled performance) while leaving reflex 
and habit (automatic performance) unaffected. This hypothesis was tested for a variety of 
driving performance and behaviour indicators including braking avoidance, the development 
of anticipatory braking and attention scheduling strategies with repeated exposure, lane 
keeping, visual exploration of billboards and the semantic encoding of billboard content into 
long-term memory. 
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5.3.1 Method 
48 subjects participated in the study. A simulated route was implemented which contained a 
rural and an urban section. The route was repeated 12 times with some variation in layout 
between repetitions. The working memory task was to count down with seven from a 
randomly selected 3-digit number. 
 
Half of the subjects performed the working memory task while the other half performed no 
secondary task. In addition, half of the group was instructed to minimise deviations to the lane 
centre on the rural road while the other group received no such instructions. 
 
In the urban environment, a critical braking scenario was implemented at a signalised 
intersection where an oncoming vehicle unexpectedly turned left and crossed the path of the 
subject vehicle. The braking scenario occurred six times, randomly distributed over the twelve 
repetitions. Employing a similar experimental design as in Paper II, it was examined how 
working memory load and increased expectancy (induced by the repeated exposure) affected 
brake onset time, gaze response time, and anticipatory visual attention scheduling (measured 
in terms of visual scanning).  
 
On the rural road, we investigated effects of working memory load on lane keeping 
performance, steering wheel reversals, visual exploration of roadside billboards and semantic 
encoding of billboard content. In addition, we examined how the instruction to optimise lane 
keeping interacted with the effect of working memory load. The key hypothesis here was that 
such deliberate optimising should require controlled performance and hence be impaired by 
working memory load. Thus the independent variables were working memory load and lane 
keeping instruction, both varied between groups. 
 
Visual behaviour was measured by means of a head-mounted eye tracking system and was 
analysed manually. Semantic encoding of billboard content into long-term memory was 
assessed by means of a post-drive recognition memory test. 
 
5.3.2 Results and discussion 
In general the results supported the hypothesis that working memory load selectively affects 
controlled performance (deliberation and exploration) but leaves automatic performance 
(reflex and habit) unaffected.  
 
In the critical braking scenario, working memory load had no impact on brake onset time. In 
particular, for the first, unexpected event, brake onset times, as well as the gaze response time 
(the time from the moment when the oncoming vehicle initiated the turn until the subjects’ 
gaze landed on the vehicle) were very similar (and even somewhat faster for the working 
memory loaded group), which is in line with the hypothesis given that initial responses to the 
present event were reflexively triggered by looming cues. With repeated exposure, both 
loaded and non-loaded subjects responded faster and also glanced more frequently towards 
the oncoming vehicle in anticipation of the event, which indicates, in line with Paper II, the 
presence of an automatic top-down selection mechanism not affected by working memory 
load. However, a subset of the non-loaded subjects developed specific strategies not exhibited 
by the loaded subjects. Specifically, many non-loaded subjects, after repeated exposure, 
began to brake before the onset of the event and exhibited very long single glances towards 
the oncoming vehicle, thus actively ignoring other relevant information. This was manifested 
in terms of a significantly larger proportion anticipatory braking responses and significantly 
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longer mean single glance duration for non-loaded subjects. This suggests, in line with the 
hypothesis, that the development of deliberate (controlled, top-down), flexible, attention 
selection strategies is impaired by working memory load.  
 
On the rural road, working memory load led to reduced lane keeping variability for non-
instructed subjects, which is in line with several previous studies (e.g., Paper I). This effect 
vanished for instructed subjects. However, the predicted lane keeping impairment for 
instructed subjects was not found (by contrast to the previous study by Salvucci and 
Beltwoska, 2008). It was suggested that this may have been due to differences in road 
curvature and the subjects’ driving experience between the two studies. In any case, the lack 
of lane keeping impairment for non-instructed subjects was in line with the present 
hypothesis, given that normal lane keeping is strongly automatised (habitual).  
 
Working memory load strongly reduced the visual exploration of billboards (controlled, 
bottom-up) and the semantic encoding of billboard content, which could be regarded as 
requiring deliberation (controlled, top-down). 
 
An overview of the present findings, mapped onto Trick and Enns’ 2-dimensional framework 
is given in Figure 6. Taken together, these results suggest that the key effect of working 
memory on driving performance is to induce a resort to reflexive and habitual behaviour, 
impairing more flexible, effortful strategies that rely on controlled performance.  
 
Figure 6 Overview of the findings of Paper III in terms of Trick and Enns’ (2009) framework. 
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5.4 Paper IV: Adaptive behaviour in the simulator: Implications for 
active safety system design 
 
This book chapter outlines a general conceptual framework for understanding adaptive 
behaviour in driving and applies it to the problem of active safety system evaluation in 
driving simulators. A similar framework, applied to the more general problem of active safety 
system requirement specification and evaluation, is outlined in Ljung Aust and Engström 
(2011).  
 
The framework starts from a general conceptualisation of adaptivity in biological systems, 
which can be viewed as a consequence of the need of an organism to sustain itself over longer 
periods of time in a continuously-changing environment (Pfeifer & Scheier, 2000). The state 
of an organism and its environment can be described in terms of a space defined by variables 
relevant for its survival (for example, blood sugar and body fluid). Within this space there is a 
viable zone that the organism must stay within to function properly and, ultimately, to 
survive. Adaptive behaviour is the result of, on the one hand, the active exploitation of 
opportunities for actions afforded by the environment, and/or created by the system, to satisfy 
goals and motives and, on the other hand, the need to remain safely within the viability zone. 
 
In the driving domain, the viability zone may be considered as a safety zone in Driver-
Vehicle-Environment state space that defines the objective opportunities for action (Summala, 
2007; Gibson and Crooks, 1938). The safety zone boundary separates situations in two 
classes: those that result in successful outcomes and those that do not. In most conditions, 
drivers seek to maintain a feeling of zero discomfort. This may be conceptualized as a comfort 
zone which should lie within the safety zone to ensure safe driving. The comfort zone is 
subjectively defined and governed by emotional signals experienced in terms of feelings 
(Damasio, 1994; Summala, 2007; Fuller, 2007; Vaa, 2007). The difference between the 
comfort and safety zones is the safety margin chosen by the driver, which can be 
operationalized, for example, in terms of time-to-contact. The maintenance of safety margins 
relies on perception of relevant information, such as optically-specified expansion rates or 
road surface textures. However, it can also be based on more general knowledge, obtained, for 
example, through traffic messages warning for slippery roads or animals on the road ahead. 
These concepts are illustrated in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 Illustration of the (objective) safety zone, the (subjective) comfort zone and the resulting 
safety margin between them in a space defined by two Driver-Vehicle Environment (DVE) parameters 
 
Adaptive strategies employed by drivers to maintain their safety margins are generally 
proactive and driven top-down by expectations on how driving scenarios will unfold. 
Examples include the self-regulation of driving demand by, for example, by slowing down 
and increasing headway, or altering attention and task allocation strategies (e.g., focusing 
attention on the road ahead when a critical event is expected).  
 
In normal driving conditions, drivers generally operate in a satisficing mode, only investing as 
much effort that is needed to remain in the comfort zone. Excitatory forces, related to specific 
goals and motives, push the driver towards the comfort zone boundary. If these excitatory 
forces are strong, or the situation is forced-paced, operation shifts to an optimising control 
mode. The mobilisation of strong effort itself induces discomfort in terms of strain or fatigue 
and is thus generally avoided unless there is strong motivation for it or if the task is forced 
paced.  
 
Failures in this adaptation process are the key mechanisms behind real-world accidents. This 
may occur due to an unexpected event or a failure to correctly perceive the safety zone 
boundary, thus leading to the adoption of inappropriate safety margins (where, in the worst 
case, the comfort zone exceeds the safety zone). Drivers may also adopt insufficient safety 
margins due to overestimation of their own capacity.  Hence, it is these types of situations that 
need to be re-created in simulator-based active safety evaluation.  
 
Based on this conceptual framework, the chapter discusses various problems associated with 
implementing critical situations in driving simulators, including how to recreate kinematic 
conditions, how to trick drivers out of their comfort zones, the consequences of using repeated 
scenarios and motivational differences between driving simulators and the real world. 
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5.5 Paper V: Attention selection and multitasking in everyday driving: A 
conceptual model 
 
This book chapter, which constitutes the core of the present thesis, outlines a conceptual 
model of attention selection and multitasking in everyday driving, with the intention to 
account for the empirical results obtained in Paper I-III as well as other existing findings in 
the driver attention literature (reviewed in Chapter 2). The model represents a further 
development of earlier models presented in Victor (2005), Engström (2008), Engström, 
Markkula and Victor (2009) and Engström (2010b).  
 
The model is based on the view of attention selection as a form of adaptive behaviour, rather 
than a consequence of limited capacity. A key starting point was thus the conceptualisation of 
adaptive behaviour outlined in Paper IV. Other main sources of inspiration were the general 
framework attention selection in driving proposed by Trick and Enns (2009) and Trick et al. 
(2004), the attention-to-action model by Norman and Shallice (1986) and the more 
neurobiologically detailed attention models developed by Cohen and colleagues (Cohen et. 
al., 2004), reviewed in Chapter 3. 
 
5.5.1 The model 
Everyday driving can be viewed as a multitasking activity where drivers have to strike a 
balance between the achievement of goals and the discomfort associated with perceived risk 
and other undesired outcomes. Attention plays a key role in this process. Safety-relevant 
information and actions need to be proactively selected in order to maintain acceptable safety 
margins. In demanding situations, or when the driver is strongly motivated towards a specific 
goal, additional attentional effort could be invested to deal with the situation. Thus the key 
function of attention selection in everyday driving is to enable an appropriate balance between 
goal achievement and the maintenance of acceptable safety margins.  
 
Central to the proposed model is the concept of schemata which represent functional units of 
action control at different levels of abstraction. In the model, to two general schema levels are 
proposed: (a) Basic schemata and (b) task context schemata. Basic schemata may be further 
subdivided into (i) sensory-motor schemata and (ii) semantic schemata. The former are 
directly linked to sensation and actuation and implement real-time sensory-motor acts or 
activities such as “keep in lane”, “avoid front obstacle” and “press button”. Sensory-motor 
schemata also include active sensing, for example, “look left”. Semantic schemata, by 
contrast, represent perceptual acts such as “recognise traffic light”. Finally, task context 
schemata represent more general tasks such as “follow the car ahead” or “turn right at T-
junction”. 
 
In terms of the model, attention selection may be conceptualised as the selection of schemata. 
Thus, attention represents the outcome of this process, i.e., a set of active schemata. In the 
model, schemata are selected by virtue of their level of activation and the selection process 
involves collaboration and competition between schemata which may be biased by sensory 
input as well as various internal sources of activation. This is largely based on the contention 
scheduling mechanism proposed by Norman and Shallice (1986). Collaboration between 
schemata results in schema coalitions. For example a “turn-right at T-junction” task context 
schemata may be associated with lower-level, basic, schemata such as “look left”, “recognise 
car“, “slow down”, “turn right” etc. Thus, an active schema coalition will determine how 
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attention and actions are proactively selected in a certain task context. Schemata may also 
compete. Thus, schemata involved in a winning coalition will inhibit related schemata which 
are not members of that coalition.  
 
The excitability of a schema depends on its strength, which determines the degree to which it 
is automatised, an idea derived from Cohen et al, (1990). Strong schemata may thus be 
triggered and run with little effort. By contrast, weak schemata require top-down cognitive 
control bias to become active and/or override competing stronger schemata. Automaticity, 
and hence schema strength, develops with experience, in particular through repeated exposure 
to consistent, as opposed to variable, perception-action mappings (Schneider and Shiffrin, 
1977; Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977; Schneider, Dumais and Shiffrin, 1983). 
 
Based on these ideas, specific mechanisms for Trick and Enns’ (2009) four selection modes 
could be outlined. In terms of the model, reflexive (bottom-up, automatic) selection occurs 
though stimulus-driven activation of strong (i.e., automatised) schemata. This may also 
involve the activation of context schemata, which corresponds to gist perception, that is, the 
rapid and effortless holistic perception of a scene (Potter, 1975). Habitual (top-down, 
automatic) selection of strong basic schemata is driven by associated task context schemata, 
which, as just described, are initially triggered reflexively by familiar scenes. Thus, basic 
schemata relevant in a certain context (such as “look left” in the “turn-right at T-junction” 
context) may be triggered automatically in advance, thus representing implicit (non-
conscious) expectations on what information and actions are relevant in the upcoming 
scenario. This is strongly related to the phenomenon known as contextual cueing studied by 
Chun and Jiang (1998, 1999).  
 
Deliberate (top-down, controlled) selection is driven by cognitive control and involves the 
specific biasing of weak (non-automatised) schemata in situations when they are needed to 
accomplish task goals. This may also involve overriding stronger schemata selected 
reflexively or habitually. Deliberate selection is thus, for example, deployed in new or 
challenging conditions such when entering a novel complex intersection, or when motivated 
towards a specific goal which requires optimising driving performance (e.g., driving faster 
than usual to keep a fixed time schedule). It is also needed to inhibit habitual tendencies such 
as the strong tendency of a Swedish driver (used to right-hand traffic) to look left when about 
to turn right at a T-junction in the UK. Deliberate selection also implements the basis for 
working memory, which corresponds to the active maintenance of schemata in the absence of 
stimulus input. 
 
Finally, exploration (bottom-up, controlled) also involves cognitive control. However, by 
contrast to the specific, goal-directed, biasing involved in deliberation, exploration, in terms 
of the model, involves a global increase in schema activation, which facilitates bottom-up 
selection of weaker schemata. This typically occurs in non-demanding driving situations 
where drivers scan the environment for potentially interesting information (Hills, 1980). Both 
deliberation and exploration requires effort and is generally associated with increased arousal. 
 
Moreover, all forms of selection may be biased by a value system with links to the individual 
schemata. Hence, a schema associated with value will have a competitive advantage in the 
competition with other schemata. The value system is also involved in the self-regulatory 
recruitment of cognitive control, where cognitive control is recruited when schemata are in 
conflict or the currently selected schema yields low value (an idea based on Botvinick et al., 
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2001). Finally, the value system plays a key role in directing schema learning. The proposed 
model is schematically illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
 
 
Figure 8 General illustration of the proposed attention selection model. Arrows represent excitatory 
and dots inhibitory links. 
 
5.5.2 Model application 
It was demonstrated by a concrete working example how the model may account for attention 
selection in the type of intersection scenario studied by Summala and colleagues (Summala 
and Räsänen, 2000; se Section 2.1.2). It was also discussed how the model suggests a novel 
way to conceptualise the relation between attention and crashes and how this may be used to 
guide analysis of accidents and incidents in naturalistic driving data. Moreover, based on the 
model, a taxonomy of dual task interference mechanisms was outlined, involving three main 
types of interference: (a) Peripheral interference (the basic competition for sensory and 
actuator systems such as the eyes and the hands) (b) structural (cross-talk) interference 
(competition between schemata) and (c) control interference (competition for cognitive 
control). Moreover, based on the model, precise definitions of driver inattention and driver 
distraction were proposed, based on the more general definitions suggested by Regan, Hallet 
and Gordon (in press). It was further suggested how value biasing, a key feature of the model, 
may influence the willingness to engage in secondary tasks while driving and how this may 
explain the extreme risks found for certain secondary task activities such as text messaging. 
 
Finally, it was discussed how the proposed model relates to existing attention selection 
models, and some further practical implications were outlined. Some directions for future 
work were also suggested, including the possibility to implement the model computationally. 
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6 Discussion 
This chapter discusses and summarises the main theoretical and empirical contributions of the 
present thesis with respect to the specific aims stated in Chapter 4. The following section 
discusses the first aim, the development of a novel theoretical framework for understanding 
attention selection in driving (Paper IV and V), and relates the proposed framework to the 
existing theories of attention reviewed in Chapter 3. Section 6.2 discusses the empirical 
results obtained in Paper I, II and III, focusing on the effects of working memory load on 
driving performance and mechanisms behind expectancy and proactive attention scheduling. 
Section 6.3 discusses the implications of the present findings regarding the generalisability of 
experimental studies to the real world (Aim 4). Section 6.4 addresses how attention may relate 
to crash risk (Aim 5), and discusses how the present model may be used to guide accident and 
incident analysis. Section 6.5 discusses applications of the present findings in the areas of 
countermeasure development and evaluation method development. Finally, Section 6.6 
provides some general conclusions. 
 
6.1 A novel theoretical perspective on attention selection in driving 
This section places the conceptual framework, and the specific attention selection model, 
developed in the present thesis (Paper IV and V) into the theoretical context reviewed in 
Chapter 3. The following section discusses the key principles of the attention selection model 
in relation to the existing models on which it was based. Section 6.1.2 then discusses how the 
present model relates to existing limited capacity model that still dominate applied research 
on attention in driving. Section 6.1.3 addresses how the key concepts attention, expectancy, 
inattention and distraction may be conceptualised and precisely defined in terms of the 
present model. Finally, Section 6.1.4 discusses limitations and suggests some directions for 
future development of the model. 
 
6.1.1 Accounting for attention selection in everyday driving 
The first specific aim of the present thesis was to develop a conceptual model of attention 
selection as it occurs in natural driving situations as opposed to constrained laboratory 
conditions. A key starting point for the model development was that attention selection could 
be viewed as a form of adaptive behaviour. As suggested in Paper IV, adaptive behaviour in 
driving results from balance between multiple excitatory and inhibitory goals/drives and can 
be generally conceptualised in terms of the maintenance of a subjective comfort zone which 
defines the safety margin to an objective, physically definable, safety zone boundary where a 
crash becomes unavoidable. The comfort zone is individually determined by a value system 
and value is represented in the brain/body by emotional signals perceived in terms of feelings 
(Damasio, 1994). Adaptive driver behaviour may thus be defined as a continuous regulation 
of behaviour, based on anticipation and perceptual feedback, with the purpose to obtain goals 
while remaining safely within the comfort zone. These concepts are based on converging 
ideas in the general driver behaviour literature (Summala, 2007; Fuller, 2007; Vaa, 2007), 
which partly originate in the classical model of automobile driving by Gibson and Crooks 
(1938). However, there have been few links between these types of models and research on 
driver attention. One exception is the control-theoretic model of driver distraction proposed 
by Lee et al. (2009). The present framework makes the link more explicit by proposing that 
attention selection can be regarded as a form of adaptive behaviour. More specifically, 
according to the present framework, the key function of attention in natural driving is thus to 
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select the right action at the right time in order to achieve goals while at the same time 
maintaining acceptable safety margins (that is, remaining within the comfort zone). 
 
While basic attention research tends to view top-down selection as always controlled and 
bottom-up selection as an automatic process, Trick and Enns’ (2009) suggested that this may 
lead to ignorance of key aspects of attention selection in driving. Their 2-dimensional 
framework has been adopted in the present thesis and a key objective of the present model 
development was to outline specific selection mechanisms for Trick and Enns’ four general 
attention selection modes: reflex, habit, deliberation and exploration. 
 
Moreover, while basic research on attention tends to focus on the role of attention in 
perception (for example in laboratory visual search tasks), attention in natural tasks is strongly 
linked to action. The schema representation used in the present model is well suited to capture 
this intimate relation link between attention and action in natural tasks and also accounts for 
the role of task context in influencing habitual selection in routine situations. The schema 
concept was largely adopted from Norman and Shallice (1986) although it has been used by 
numerous other authors (see Arbib, 1992 and Pezzulo, 2007 for reviews). Other concepts such 
as behaviours (Brooks, 1991), microbehaviours (Sprague and Ballard, 1993) or visual 
routines (Hayhoe, 2000; Salgian and Ballard, 1998) are essentially similar to schemata as 
conceived in the present model, that is, as functional units of action control.  
 
The presently proposed attention selection mechanism was largely based on Norman and 
Shallice’s (1986) contention scheduling principle, which involves a set of parallel, potentially 
competing, schemata, selected by virtue of their level of activation. The selection could then 
be biased top-down or bottom-up by various sources. In the present model these sources 
include sensory input, task context schemata, cognitive control and the value system. This 
general idea is also largely in line with the biased competition hypothesis of the neural basis 
for attention selection (Desimone and Duncan, 1995) but conceptualised here on a more 
abstract level, with a stronger focus on action selection. 
 
However, Norman and Shallice (1986) did not suggest any specific mechanism behind 
automaticity but merely suggested that those processes that can be implemented by contention 
scheduling alone, and thus do not require bias from the supervisory attention system (SAS), 
are automatic. This is hence similar to the classical, somewhat circular (Navon, 1984; 
Neumann, 1987), view that automatic processes are those that do not require attentional 
resources. By contrast, the present model suggests a more specific conceptualisation of 
automaticity in terms of schema strength, which develops with repeated exposure to 
consistent stimulus-action contingencies in the real world (Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977; 
Schneider et al., 1983). This idea was mainly adopted from the model of Cohen et al. (1990), 
further developed in Miller and Cohen (2001) who proposed that automaticity can be 
understood in terms of neural pathway strength. Thus, in terms of the present model, strong 
schemata implement automatic (reflexive and habitual) selection.  
 
In the present model, weak schemata need to be biased by cognitive control to become active 
or to override strong, competing, schemata. This concept was adopted from Miller and Cohen 
(2001) and is essentially similar to the SAS proposed by Norman and Shallice (1986). Hence 
cognitive control is needed for controlled selection (deliberation and exploration). Moreover, 
working memory may be viewed as deliberate selection (active maintenance), of schemata in 
the absence of sensory input. This provides a strong basis for interpreting the present 
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empirical results (Paper I-III) on the effects of working memory load on driving performance, 
as further discussed in Section 6.2.2).  
 
However, neither Miller and Cohen (2001), nor Norman and Shallice (1986), address how 
cognitive control is recruited. An account of this in needed to avoid the homunculus problem 
(who controls cognitive control?) and but also to understand how attention is self-regulated in 
natural driving conditions. The present model suggests that such self-regulation is based on 
continuous feedback from the value system, which monitors the performance of the schema 
system in terms of whether the current task yields sufficiently valuable outcome and/or 
whether schemata are in conflict. If the value system indicates that current performance is 
insufficient to meet task demands or there is a conflict between schemata, cognitive control is 
recruited to resolve the problem by means of deliberate selection. This idea is largely based 
on the neurobiologically based model by Botvinick et al., (2001), but also generally in line 
with the control-theoretic accounts of Lee et al. (2009) and Hockey (1997).  
 
Schema selection is also strongly biased by associations with a value system which may be 
innate or established through experience. This idea, which was not considered by Norman and 
Shallice (1986), was mainly inspired by the computational models developed by Sporns et al., 
(2000) and Sprague and Ballard (2003). In line with Vuilleumier (2005), the value biasing 
mechanism is assumed to work according to the same principles as other top-down and 
bottom-up biases in the model. 
 
The present model is also generally compatible with the SEEV model developed by Wickens 
and colleagues (e.g., Wickens and McCarley 2008; Wickens and Horrey 2009), which 
incorporates many of the key aspects attention selection in natural driving addressed in the 
present thesis. However, SEEV is still essentially a model of visual scanning and does not 
provide any specific account of attention selection mechanisms. 
 
The present model thus represents a synthesis of several converging themes in the basic 
attention literature, applied here for the first time in driving domain. The model also provides 
a link between these attention models and the general driver behaviour literature. While the 
present model is most strongly related to the model by Norman and Shallice (1986), it 
incorporates several additional aspects of strong relevance to everyday driving such as a more 
specific account of automaticity, the self-regulatory deployment of cognitive control and 
value biasing. The following section addresses how the present model relates to models in the 
limited capacity tradition. 
 
6.1.2 Limited capacity and dual task interference 
While the main focus of the present model was to account for aspects traditionally not 
accounted for by limited capacity models, such as those discussed in the previous section, it 
does not deny the existence of limited capacity and dual task interference. On the contrary, 
the model offers a precise taxonomy of different forms of dual task interference, based on the 
distinction between peripheral, structural and control interference (see Paper V). Many 
limited capacity models are less specific in this respect. For example, multiple resource theory 
(Wickens, 1984, 2002) is rather vague on the actual mechanisms underlying the different 
resources. On the one hand, resources are sometimes described as the “fuel” of attention 
(Wickens and McCarley, 2008), a characterisation which, in terms of the present model, best 
fits the role of cognitive control. However, at the same time, specific sensory functions such 
as focal vision are also considered as resources (Wickens, 2002). Peripheral interference, such 
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as the competition for the eyes by spatially separated stimuli, was originally considered 
outside the scope of resource theory (Wickens, 1984) but now seems to be included in the 
visual perceptual resource (Wickens, 2002; Wickens and McCarley, 2008). Based on the 
present model, this conflates the distinction between of peripheral and structural interference, 
which is of crucial importance in natural driving. 
 
Similarly, the present model does account for “bottlenecks”, but denies the strong claim by 
some authors that a single central bottleneck is sufficient to explain dual task interference 
(Pashler and Johnston, 1998; Levy et al., 2006). Rather, according to the present model, 
bottlenecks may occur at all three levels of interference: due to peripheral interference (since 
the eyes can only be directed towards one location at a time), structural interference (due to 
inhibitory cross-talk between similar schemata) as well as control interference (due to 
concurrent demands for cognitive control). 
 
With respect to limited capacity models, the present model is probably most closely related to 
the model by Kahneman (1973) who proposed a general attentional resource related to the 
effortful deployment of attention, similar to cognitive control in the present model, and 
multiple satellite structures, similar to the basic schemata in the present model.  
 
In general, the present model is not fundamentally incompatible with limited capacity models. 
Rather, it represents a shift in focus from attentional limitations to the role of attention 
selection in adaptive driver behaviour. A key claim of the present thesis is that the latter is the 
key to understand of the relation between attention, performance and crashes in natural 
driving, although capacity limitations do exist and must be accounted for as well. 
 
6.1.3 Defining attention, expectancy, inattention and distraction  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the concept of attention has been notoriously hard to pin down 
scientifically. In its common-sense meaning (represented, e.g., by the quote from James in 
Chapter 3), attention generally refers to the conscious, effortful selection of some perceptual 
inputs over others. This view is still prevalent in contemporary attention research, where 
“attentive” processes generally refers to those that are conscious and effortful (i.e., controlled) 
while “pre-attentive” processes are unconscious and effortless (i.e., automatic). Moreover, 
top-down selection is generally viewed as controlled while bottom-up selection is considered 
automatic.  
 
However, this view of attention is difficult to apply in the driving domain where many key 
aspects of performance are strongly overlearned and automatised and thus, in this view, does 
not involve attention at all. The present thesis suggests a different conceptualisation of 
attention selection which includes all four selection modes suggested by Trick and Enns 
(2009; reflex, habit, deliberation and exploration). As described above, the model defines 
attention selection as the selection of schemata, and attention as the outcome of this 
processes, that is, a set of active schemata. Trick and Enns’ four modes of selection then 
relate to how the schemata are selected, that is, whether selection is driven bottom-up or top-
down and whether it involves cognitive control. Hence, in this view, attention selection may 
be both controlled and automatic. From this perspective, the traditional notion of attention 
refers mainly to deliberation while the other three selection modes fall outside the traditional 
scope of attention. While such a view may be sufficient to account for many laboratory 
phenomena, it clearly leaves out aspects of key relevance for understanding selection of 
information and action in natural driving situations. 
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Traditionally, a distinction is also often made between various forms of attention, such as 
selective, divided, switched, focused and sustained attention, however, often without precise 
definitions of the mechanisms involved (e.g., Wickens and McCarley, 2008). The present 
model offers a clearer conceptualisation of such varieties of attention. For example, to the 
extent that certain schemata are selected over others, attention is selective. If several schemata 
are selected in parallel (while, for example, competing for cognitive control) attention is 
divided. Sustained attention involves the deployment of cognitive control over a longer time 
period to sustain activation of weak schemata. However, the presently proposed general term 
“attention selection” applies to all these variants and also emphasises the active nature of 
attention.  
 
Furthermore, expectancy may be defined as the anticipatory top-down biasing of specific 
schemata. Thus, expectancy and attention can essentially be viewed as two sides of the same 
coin. Like attention, expectancy may be controlled and accessible to conscious awareness 
(deliberate) as well as automatic and unconscious (habitual). 
 
Paper V also discusses how driver inattention and driver distraction may be more precisely 
understood in terms of the present model. If one accepts the general definition proposed by 
Regan et al. (in press) of driver inattention as "Insufficient, or no attention, to activities 
critical for safe driving", this can be understood in terms of the present model as cases where 
certain schemata critical for “safe driving” are not sufficiently active (for whatever reason). 
Regan et al (in press) further define driver distraction as: "The diversion of attention away 
from activities critical for safe driving toward a competing activity, which may result in 
insufficient or no attention to activities critical for safe driving." 
 
In terms of the present model, distraction can be understood as the selection of non-safety-
critical schemata that compete with those considered safety critical, with the consequence that 
the activation of safety-critical schemata is reduced. According to the present model, this may 
occur due to any of the three proposed types of dual task interference (see Paper V):  
 
a. Peripheral interference: If gaze is directed off-road, safety-critical schemata may to 
become deactivated (or fail to be triggered) due to reduced visual input;  
b. Structural interference: If, for example, the secondary task is strongly perceptually 
loading, safety-critical schemata may be inhibited due to structural cross-talk 
interference between schemata. 
c. Control interference: If the competing task demands cognitive control, weak (non-
automatised) safety-critical schemata may become deactivated due to a lack of 
cognitive control.  
 
However, the model does not resolve this more philosophical problem of how to define a 
“safety critical activity” (see Regan et al., in press, and Rasmussen, 1990, for a further 
discussion of this issue).   
 
6.1.4 Limitations and directions for future model development 
One issue somewhat left open in the present version of the model concerns the precise role of 
arousal. It is generally accepted that the effortful deployment of attention (cognitive control) 
is associated with an increased in arousal (Kahneman, 1973; Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005). 
Arousal is manifested in the brain as a global modulation of neural activity originating from 
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the reticular activation system in the brainstem and this modulation is generally believed to 
play a key role in attention (Coull, 1998). In particular, the influential cue utilisation 
hypothesis proposed by Easterbrook (1959) suggests that an increase in arousal, or “emotional 
drive”, leads to increased attentional selectivity resulting in a narrowing of attention. This 
constitutes an explanation for the classical Yerkes-Dodson law (Yerkes and Dodson, 1908) 
which states that performance depends on arousal according to an inverted U-shaped function. 
However, the physiological mechanisms behind effort and arousal and its link to attention are 
still only partially known and to keep the present model as simple as possible, these aspects 
were not explicitly included in the model but rather conceptualised as an implicit effect of 
cognitive control. However, future developments of the model could incorporate more 
specific mechanisms for how arousal modulates schema selectivity. Here, the work by Aston 
Jones and Cohen (2005) and Gilzenrat et al. (2010) is a good starting point. 
 
A related issue concerns the mechanisms behind the self-regulatory recruitment of cognitive 
control. In the present version of the model, these mechanisms were rather vaguely defined in 
terms of monitoring of schema conflicts and outcome by the value system. This idea was 
based on the much more detailed neurobiological model by Botvinick et al. (2001; Botvinick, 
2007) and future development of the model could incorporate more detailed accounts of these 
mechanisms, which may also be linked to the arousal modulation just discussed (as suggested 
by Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005).  
 
In the future, it would also be interesting to explore the possibilities to implement the present 
model computationally. As illustrated, for example, in the “conceptual” simulation in Paper V 
(Figure 4 and 5 in Paper V), the context-driven interactions between top-down  and bottom-up 
factors in natural tasks may be rather complex and, thus, a computational model may yield 
novel predictions not readily accessible by conceptual analysis. Existing work in this area, 
that may serve as potential starting points, include the computational implementation of the 
conceptual Norman-Shallice model by Cooper and Shallice (2000) and the work of Ballard 
and colleagues (Salgian and Ballard, 1998; Sprague and Ballard, 2003). Also, Botvinick 
(2008) provides a useful review of computational hierarchical action/attention selection 
models that should be applicable also to the modelling of drivers’ attention selection in 
naturalistic driving situations.  
 
6.2 Understanding the relation between attention and driving 
performance 
 
This section summarises these empirical results obtained in Paper I-III, relates them to the 
existing literature reviewed in Chapter 2 and suggest how they may be interpreted in terms of 
the present theoretical framework (outlined in Paper IV and V and discussed in the previous 
section). The discussion focuses on the key open empirical research questions identified in 
Chapter 2, relating to the specific aims 2 and 3 of this thesis: How working memory load 
affects driving performance and the key mechanisms behind expectancy and dynamic 
attention scheduling. However, effects of visual time sharing, partly addressed in Paper I, are 
briefly addressed as well  
 
6.2.1 Effects of visual time sharing 
As concluded in Chapter 2, effects of visual time sharing on driving performance are 
relatively well understood. Paper I found, in line with existing studies (Zwahlen, Adams, & de 
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Bald, 1988; Greenberg et al., 2003; Horrey et al., 2006; Merat and Jamson, 2008), that visual 
time sharing led to increased standard deviation of lane position (SDLP) compared to baseline 
driving (no task). However, this effect was only statistically significant in one of the three 
sub-studies, the fixed base simulator. A strong tendency was also observed in the moving-
base simulator but no effect was observed in the field study. There was no increase in the 
number of lane exits in any of the sub-studies. The visual task also led to a relatively strong 
increase in steering wheel reversal rate. In a subsequent more detailed analysis of this data, 
which also included data from a rural road scenario not reported in Paper I, Markkula and 
Engström (2006) found a typical pattern where lane deviation builds up during glances away 
from the road which is intermittently corrected by a relatively large steering wheel correction 
when the driver looks back. An example of this pattern is shown in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9 Synchronised gaze and steering wheel angle signals during visual time sharing illustrating the 
typical large, intermittent, steering correction when the driver looks back to the road. Radial gaze 
represents the combined vertical and horizontal gaze angle (from Markkula and Engström, 2006) 
 
Also in line with existing studies (Curry, et al., 1975; Antin et al., 1990; Merat and Jamson, 
2008), the results from Paper I showed that visual time sharing resulted in a reduction of 
speed. There was also a significant increase in heart rate and skin conductance which 
indicates increased arousal. Finally, as reported in a companion paper providing a more 
detailed analysis of visual behaviour (Victor et al., 2005), glance durations to the IVIS display 
were consistently shorter in the field than in the simulator.  
 
Effects of visual time sharing on object and event detection were not empirically investigated 
in the present thesis. However, as reviewed in Chapter 2, other studies have found that visual 
time sharing leads to significant response delays, both to slowing lead vehicles (Lamble et al., 
1996; Horrey et al., 2006) and artificial stimuli (Merat and Jamson, 2008). This is consistent 
with naturalistic driving studies (Klauer et al., 2006; Olson et al., 2009; Hickman et al., 2010) 
which have found a strong relation between visual diversion from the forward roadway and 
the risk for being involved in safety critical events.  
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Interpretation 
In terms of the taxonomy of interference mechanisms outlined in Paper V, effects of visual 
time sharing on event detection are partly due to peripheral interference related to competition 
for the eyes and partly due to structural (cross-talk) interference between competing schemata 
and/or control interference (competition for cognitive control). It seems like the latter type of 
interference dominates for artificial detection tasks such as the Peripheral Detection Task 
(PDT), as indicated by the results of Merat and Jamson (2008) who found the same effect of a 
phone dialling task regardless of the stimulus modality of the detection task stimuli. This may 
be explained by the fact that these stimuli are relatively predictable and the subject is able to 
schedule the visual time sharing to reduce effects of peripheral interference. However, 
peripheral interference seems to play a stronger role in affecting responses to critical events, 
such as a braking lead vehicle (Lee et al., 2002; Horrey et al., 2006). This makes sense given 
that these events are less predictable and thus may more often coincide with off-road glances. 
As indicated by recent naturalistic observation and driving studies (reviewed in Section 
2.1.2), peripheral interference in responding to critical events (due to eyes off road) is 
probably the most important single factor contributing to road crashes.  
 
It seems likely that the increased lane deviation due to visual time sharing observed in Paper I 
occurred mainly due to peripheral interference related to the competition for the eyes. Even if 
lane keeping may be guided by peripheral vision (Summala, Nieminen et al., 1996), it may be 
assumed that the quality of visual input required for lane keeping is reduced during off-road 
glances. This leads to the intermittent lateral control strategy illustrated in Figure 9 resulting 
in increased lane keeping variability. 
 
As demonstrated in particular by Salvucci and Taatgen (2008), a single bottleneck model may 
at least partly account for such peripheral interference during visual time sharing and its effect 
on lateral control. This is not surprising, given that the eye itself can be viewed as a strong 
bottleneck that must be deployed serially (although, as noted by Wickens, 2002, ambient 
vision may to a large extent function in parallel to focal vision). 
 
However, limited capacity models fail to account for other aspects of the results obtained in 
Paper I, in particular the compensatory speed reduction and the fact that lane keeping 
performance was not adversely affected in the field. The present model offers an alternative 
interpretation of these results, based on the general view of attention selection as a form of 
adaptive behaviour. In terms of the model, the results reported in Paper I can generally be 
understood as a mobilisation of attentional effort (deliberate selection) to keep the variability 
in lane position within acceptable boundaries, representing the driver’s individual comfort 
zone. More specifically, when instructed to perform the visual task, the subjects mobilised 
cognitive control to manage the dual task situation. This resulted in increased arousal, as 
indicated by increased heart rate and galvanic skin response. In order to compensate for the 
degraded visual input from the forward roadway subjects reduced their speed. In the simulator 
sub-studies, the participants allowed rather long glances to the secondary task display which 
resulted in increased keeping variability. However, this variability may still be regarded to be 
within their comfort zones. In the field, however, the comfort zone could be expected to be 
smaller (and safety margins larger) due to the actual risk involved; hence glances to the S-
IVIS display were shorter and lane keeping was not allowed to deteriorate. 
 
A general implication of this interpretation is that effects of time sharing on driving cannot be 
predicted solely based on dual task interference due to limited capacity, but also strongly 
depends on adaptive attention allocation strategies. The degree to which the driver is willing 
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to take the eyes off the road and let lane keeping deteriorate is determined, on the one hand, 
by the motivation to accomplish the secondary task and, on the other, by the driver’s 
individual comfort zone. If the comfort zone is large (e.g. when driving on a wide motorway 
in sparse traffic or in the simulator at no real risk), drivers may allow for relatively large 
performance decrements which will not be predicted solely based on the difficulty of the 
secondary task. Thus, adaptive behaviour may be very prevalent, not only in real world 
driving situations, but also in classical dual task settings, at least as long as attention 
allocation is self-paced and the driver is allowed to operate in satisficing mode. The present 
thesis offers a theoretical framework for understanding such effects which are not well 
accounted for by traditional limited capacity models. 
 
6.2.2 Effects of working memory load 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, effects of working memory load on driving performance are poorly 
understood and existing studies have often yielded apparently inconsistent results. Hence, one 
of the key aims of the present thesis was to obtain a better understanding of how working 
memory load affects driving performance and identify possible reasons for the existing 
inconsistencies. Below the main present findings with respect to event detection/response, 
semantic encoding and vehicle control are discussed separately, followed by a general 
discussion on how these results may be reconciled based on the present theoretical framework. 
 
Working memory load and event detection-response 
Paper II found that working memory load led to a small but significant response delay to a 
braking lead vehicle with brake lights turned on. The effect was independent of repeated 
exposure and occurred also for the first, entirely unexpected, braking event. This is generally 
in line with existing similar studies that investigated the effect of working memory load on 
responses to lead vehicle braking events cued by brake light onsets (e.g., Brookhuis, et. 
al.1991; Alm & Nilsson, 1995; Lee et al., 2001; Strayer, et al., 2003; Strayer and Drews, 
2004; Strayer et al., 2006; Levy et al., 2006; Salvucci and Beltowska, 2008). However, Paper 
III used a different type of scenario, a suddenly turning incoming vehicle, which did not 
involve any predictive cues. Rather, responses in this scenario were triggered solely by 
looming and movement cues, at least for the first, unexpected, event. In this study, no 
response delay due to working memory load was found. This was the case for brake onset 
time as well as gaze response time. This result is consistent with other studies that included 
non-cued events (Muttart et al., 2007; Baumann et al., 2008) and supports the idea that 
working memory load mainly affects responses to cued events.  
 
Moreover, in a follow-up on Paper II, Engström (2010a) conducted a meta-analysis of 
existing lead vehicle braking studies on working memory load which strongly indicated the 
response delay attributed to working memory load in these studies depended strongly on 
scenario criticality. More specifically, studies that have employed non-critical lead vehicle 
braking scenarios with large initial headways have typically found large effects, whereas 
studies that used more critical scenarios (small initial headways) found smaller effects. 
 
Working memory load and semantic interpretation/encoding 
Paper III found, in line with Strayer et al (2003), that working memory load strongly impaired 
subsequent recognition of roadside billboard signs, suggesting that working memory load 
affects semantic encoding into long-term memory. In another study conducted within the 
scope of the present thesis, Engström and Markkula (2007) further demonstrated that working 
memory load impairs semantic interpretation of information. The study employed the Lane 
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Change Test (LCT; Mattes, 2003) methodology, where subjects are required to change to a 
specified lane when commanded by pop-up roadside signs. It was found that working memory 
load led to a significantly increased number of erroneous lane selections. The most common 
error was that the driver did not perform any lane change at all. However, there were also 
several cases where a lane-change was made, but to the wrong lane. This indicates that the 
sign was detected but incorrectly interpreted. 
 
Working memory load and vehicle control 
Paper I, Paper III and several other studies (Brookhuis et al., 1991; Östlund et al., 2004; 
Horrey and Simons, 2004; Törnros and Bolling, 2005; Mazzae et al., 2005; Mattes et al., 
2007; Merat and Jamson, 2008; Mehler et al., 2009; Reimer, 2009) found reduced lane 
keeping variability due to working memory load. However, as reviewed in Chapter 2, these 
results are inconsistent with other studies that found the opposite effect (i.e., impaired lateral 
control due to working memory load). However, these studies differed from the present 
studies (and the others cited above) in several important respects. For example, Salvucci and 
Belowska (2008) explicitly instructed subjects to minimise lane deviations from the lane 
centre. Other studies that found this effect employed artificial tracking tasks (Briem and 
Hedman, 1995; Strayer et al., 2001; Creem and Profitt, 2001) or non-standard driving task 
such as steering with a track ball or a computer mouse in a brain scanner (Just et al., 2008).  
 
In both Paper I and Paper III, the reduced lane keeping variability was accompanied by an 
increased frequency in micro steering reversals. However, in Paper I, this effect was rather 
weak and found only in the field. A more detailed analysis of steering wheel data from the 
same study (as well as data from the simulated rural road) was conducted by Markkula and 
Engström (2006). This analysis demonstrated that, by contrast to visual tasks which, as 
described above, induce relatively large steering reversals (Figure 9), working memory load 
induce an increase in microscopic steering corrections. This effect is illustrated in Figure 10. 
Thus, the weak effect on steering wheel reversal rate found in Paper I may be explained by a 
too large setting of the gap size parameter (1 deg,). This was further supported in Paper III, 
which, in line with Markkula and Engström (2006), found the strongest effect of working 
memory load on steering wheel reversals for the smallest gap size (0.1 deg.). Similar effects 
of working memory load on steering activity have been found in other studies, although these 
have generally used different metrics such as steering entropy (Boer, 2000; Boer et al., 2005), 
which is not diagnostic of the amplitude of steering wheel movements.  
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Figure 10 Comparison of the steering wheel angle signal for baseline driving and driving while 
performing a cognitively (working memory-) loading task (from Markkula and Engström, 2006) 
 
Working memory load had no effects on vehicle speed, neither in Paper I nor in Paper III. 
This indicates that drivers did not increase longitudinal safety margins to compensate for the 
reduced attention. As reviewed in Chapter 2, other studies have found inconsistent results 
with respect the effect of working memory load on safety margin compensation (Patten et al., 
2003; Horrey and Simons, 2007; Östlund et al., 2004). 
 
Working memory load, visual behaviour and physiological state 
Another key finding in Paper I was that working memory load induces a gaze concentration 
towards the road centre. This effect is illustrated in Figure 11, adopted from Victor et al., 
(2005) who conducted a more detailed analysis of the same data. Consistent with this, Paper 
III found that working memory load significantly reduced the visual exploration of billboards. 
The gaze concentration effect have also been found in several other studies (Recarte and 
Nunes, 2003, Harbluk et al. 2007; Reimer, 2009).  
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Figure 11. Spatial density plots of gaze angle, demonstrating gaze concentration as a function of 
working memory load. These data were obtained in the field for motorway driving. Left panel: 
Baseline driving (no task). Right panel: a cognitively loading working memory task (from Victor et 
al., 2005). 
 
Paper I also found some indications of increased physiological arousal due to working 
memory load. However, these effects were rather weak and only statistically significant in the 
field. Mehler et al. (2009) found a much stronger relationship between working memory load 
and physiological arousal and it is possible that the present weak effects may have been due to 
limited sensitivity of the measurement equipment. 
 
Interpretation 
Taken together, the present results from Paper I and Paper III indicate that working memory 
load leads to more focused scanning and steering behaviour, resulting in reduced lateral 
control variability but, by contrast to visual tasks, no compensation of safety margins. There 
were also weak indications in Paper I that working memory load led to increased arousal. 
 
These results seem difficult to reconcile with existing limited capacity models. The 
predictions of multiple resource theory with respect to effects of working memory load are 
rather vague and have been subject to debate. For example, Moray (1999), advocating a single 
channel theory, suggested that MRT should not predict any interference between mobile 
phone conversation and driving since these tasks rely on different resources. However, 
Wickens (1999) replied that such interference is accounted for by common demands for 
perceptual and cognitive resources within the stage dichotomy. However, resource models do 
not offer precise predictions of which aspects of driving that would be susceptible to such 
interference.  
 
By contrast, single bottleneck models (Pashler and Johnston, 1998; Salvucci and Taatgen, 
2008) offer very detailed predictions, suggesting that working memory loading tasks compete 
with driving tasks for a central bottleneck and, thus, the two tasks have to be performed in a 
serial manner. This yields the key prediction that working memory load should lead to less 
frequent steering corrections and, as a result, increased variability in lane position (Salvucci 
and Taatgen, 2008). Moreover, responses to critical events should always be delayed by a 
fixed amount during working memory load (Salvucci and Taatgen, 2008). These predictions 
are in line with some existing findings but contradictory to others. In particular, the predicted 
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impairment in lateral control has been found for artificial tracking tasks, in experimental set-
ups that used non-standard input controls and when subjects were instructed to optimise lane 
keeping performance. However, the present studies (Paper I and III) as well as numerous 
other studies have found the opposite effect, that is, enhanced lane keeping, accompanied by 
increased steering frequency. These results directly contradict the predictions of single 
bottleneck models. Single bottleneck models are, however, in line with the finding of Paper II, 
and several other studies, that working memory load delays responses in lead vehicle braking 
scenarios. However, they do not explain the finding in Paper III, supported by Muttart et al. 
(2007) and Baumann (2008) that responses solely triggered by looming appear to be 
unaffected by working memory load. Neither do they explain the large differences in the 
response delay observed by different studies which seem to be directly related to scenario 
criticality (Engström, 2010a).  
 
The present framework offers a possible explanation for these apparently contradictory results, 
namely that working memory load mainly affects controlled performance but leave 
automatised tasks unaffected. More specifically, in terms of Trick and Enns’ (2009) 
framework, the hypothesis suggests that working memory load should impair deliberation and 
exploration and induce a resort to reflex and habit. In terms of the present model (Paper V), 
automaticity is determined by the strength of schemata which is established through repeated 
exposure to consistent mappings during real world driving. Weak, non-automatised, schemata 
require cognitive control to be activated. Since working memory loading tasks require 
cognitive control, top-down activation of weak schemata will be depleted resulting in 
impaired performance on non-automatised tasks. However, strong, automtatised, schemata 
which do not rely on cognitive control should not be affected by working memory load. 
 
The empirical results obtained in Paper I-III, as well as other studies, are generally in line 
with this interpretation. Normal lane keeping is a strongly automatised task and should thus, 
contrary to the prediction of Salvucci and Taatgen (2008), not be negatively affected by 
working memory load (Paper I, III). The same holds for responses to unexpected events solely 
triggered by looming cues, which were not affected in Paper III.   
 
However, speeded braking responses to brake light cues can be regarded as controlled since 
brake light onsets normally do not require an immediate braking response. In real world 
driving, there is no consistent mapping between brake light onsets and immediate braking. 
Thus, these responses have not been automatised and should be slowed by working memory 
load (as found by Paper II). The same argument also apples to other predictive cues, such as 
the downstream traffic events studied by Muttart et al. (2007). However, it should be noted 
that this specific idea was not tested in a single experiment in the present thesis. In a future 
study, this could be straightforwardly tested by systematically varying the presence of brake 
lights in an unexpected lead vehicle braking scenario. The key model prediction would be that 
working memory load only delays responses when brake lights are present. 
 
Semantic interpretation and encoding of information should also be impaired by working 
memory load (Paper III), given that this directly involves working memory.  
 
This general hypothesis that working memory load mainly affects controlled performance 
may also explain why some existing studies found that working memory load induced 
impaired lateral control. As mentioned above, a common denominator of these studies is that 
they employed non-practiced lateral control task such as artificial tracking or non-standard 
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control inputs. Hence, these tasks should rely on cognitive control and be affected by working 
memory load.  
 
Still, Salvucci and Beltowska (2008), who used a normal lane keeping task, found impaired 
lane keeping due to working memory load, thus supporting the prediction of their bottleneck 
model. However, in this study, participants were instructed to minimise deviations to the lane 
centre, that is, to optimise performance. In terms of the present model, such optimising relies 
on cognitive control, which may explain this contradictory result. This idea was directly 
tested in Paper III, where half of the subjects were given a similar instruction as in Salvucci 
and Beltowska (2008). However, while the expected lane keeping enhancement was obtained 
for non-instructed subjects, the predicted impairment was not found for instructed subjects 
(working memory load had no effect for this group). Thus, the hypothesis that working 
memory load selectively affects controlled tasks was generally supported but not completely 
confirmed by the results of Paper III (possible reasons for the inconsistencies with Salvucci 
and Beltowska, 2008, are discussed in Paper IIII). An alternative way to directly test the 
hypothesis with respect to lateral control would be to manipulate automaticity in terms of the 
difficulty of the lateral control task. This could, for example, be done by altering the type of 
control device used for steering. Thus, a future study could compare the effect of working 
memory load on lane keeping performed with a normal steering wheel or a joystick. The 
present model would predict that working memory load induces enhanced lane keeping 
performance in the former case and impaired performance in the latter. 
 
It should be noted that the suggested hypothesis may in principle be accounted for by limited 
capacity models. In terms of resource models, one may simply state that tasks not affected by 
working memory load do not require cognitive resources, that is, they are automatised. For 
bottleneck models, this would amount to giving up the strict assumption of single serial 
bottleneck. However, given the usually rather vague conceptualisation of resources or 
bottlenecks, it seems unclear a-priori which tasks that should be regarded as automatised (i.e., 
demanding no resources or bypassing the bottleneck) and which should be regarded as 
automatised. This makes such an account somewhat circular (see Neumann, 1987, and Navon, 
1984, for similar arguments). The present model offers a more specific account of the 
mechanisms underlying automaticity (schema strength established through exposure to 
consistent mappings) which avoids this circularity and enables more specific predictions.  
 
A key finding of the present thesis, as well as several previous studies, not discussed so far, is 
the enhanced lane keeping effect, accompanied by increased steering frequency and gaze 
concentration. This finding is clearly very difficult to reconcile with limited capacity models, 
which provide no plausible explanation why driving performance would be enhanced by 
cognitively loading tasks. One proposed explanation is that the enhanced lane keeping effect 
is due to an increase in steering effort to increase lateral safety margins to compensate for the 
reduced attention to the road (Törnros and Bolling, 2005; Reimer, 2009; Paper I). However, a 
problem with this hypothesis is that working memory load, unlike visual time sharing, does 
not consistently result in an adjustment of longitudinal safety margins, such as a reduction of 
speed (Paper I, Paper III). Given that this would be the least effortful way to increase safety 
margins, one would expect it to occur before any further effort is invested in lateral control.    
The present model offers an alternative explanation, initially suggested in Paper I and further 
developed in Paper III. When driving in non-demanding conditions, drivers may invest 
cognitive control to visually explore the environment and allow lane keeping performance to 
degrade as long as safety margins are not violated. This leads to non-optimal, satisficing, lane 
keeping performance, which leaves room for improvement (that drivers are indeed satisficing 
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in the baseline condition was confirmed in Paper III, where performance improved 
substantially for drivers instructed to opimise lane keeping).  
 
Since, according to the present model, visual exploration relies on cognitive control (Paper 
V), it should suffer under working memory load, as confirmed by Paper III. This leads to 
concentration of gaze towards the road centre (as found in Paper I) which yields enhanced 
visual input for lane keeping. This will enhance the strongly automatised lane keeping schema 
thus leading to more frequent steering corrections and improved lane keeping compared to the 
sub-optimal, satisficing, baseline performance. Hence, the effect should not be found for 
drivers that are optimising, as confirmed by Paper III.  
 
The present framework also suggests a possible explanation for the inconsistent effects of 
working memory load on longitudinal control (speed and headway). Given that working 
memory load induces a resort to habit, one would expect loaded drivers to resort to their 
“default” longitudinal safety margins. Hence, if drivers are instructed to drive at the posted 
speed limit, the effect of working memory load on speed will depend on the difference 
between the posted speed and drivers’, subjectively defined, default speed. Thus, some loaded 
drivers may speed-up while others may slow down when loaded by a working memory task. 
This implies that a key effect of WM load should be an increased between-subject variance 
compared to baseline, which was indeed found in Paper III (this was also found in the 
analysis for Paper II but eventually not reported in the paper). 
 
To conclude, the present framework offers a novel interpretation of the effects of working 
memory load on driving performance that may reconcile apparently inconsistent results in the 
literature. In particular, the idea that working memory load mainly affects controlled 
performance, but leaves automatised tasks unaffected, represents a novel contribution of the 
present thesis that can be further tested in future studies. Further implications of these ideas 
with respect to the generalisability of results from experimental studies to the real world are 
discussed in Section 6.3. First, however, we will address how the present framework may 
account for mechanisms behind attention scheduling in natural tasks. 
 
6.2.3 Expectancy and anticipatory attention scheduling 
While both experimental and naturalistic driving studies provide strong evidence that glances 
in the wrong direction (most often off-road) induce long response delays and cause crashes, 
little is known about drivers’ proactive attention and gaze scheduling. As demonstrated by 
Summala and colleagues (Summala and Räsänen, 2000) in the field and Shinoda et al. (2000) 
in the simulator, top-down factors, such as task goals and context-induced expectancy, seem 
to be of key importance in determining drivers’ attention allocation and visual scanning 
patterns. However, the basic mechanisms behind top-down attention selection and scheduling 
are largely unknown. A key aim of the present thesis was to address this research gap. 
 
In Paper II and III, expectancy and proactive attention scheduling was studied by means of 
exposing subjects to repeated critical events. A main goal was to examine to what extent top-
down, expectancy-driven, attention selection and scheduling relies on cognitive control (i.e., 
represents controlled, as opposed to automatic, performance). As reviewed in Section 3.2.1, a 
widely held view is that top-down selection is controlled while bottom-up selection is 
automatic (e.g., Jonides, 1981).  
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In the present studies a critical event was repeated six times for cognitively loaded and non-
loaded subjects. A key idea behind this experimental design was that repeated exposure to the 
events should gradually increase expectancy. Thus, the first, unexpected, scenario should be 
triggered mainly bottom-up while top-down selection should increase with repeated exposure.  
 
Results 
In Paper II, a lead vehicle braking scenario was repeated six times for loaded and non-loaded 
subjects. The key dependent measure was accelerator release time. There were significant 
main effects of both working memory load and exposure but no interaction. Working memory 
load led to a constant small (average 178 ms) response delay across exposures. Repeated 
exposure led to a strong reduction in response time for both loaded and non-loaded drivers, 
with the main effect (374 ms) between the first and the second exposure. 
 
In Paper III, a critical scenario was again repeated six times. However, this time the scenario 
(an oncoming vehicle suddenly turning at a signalised intersection) was designed to be more 
critical than the lead vehicle braking scenario in Paper III, and automatically triggered by 
looming/movement cues. In addition to brake response time, eye-glances towards the 
oncoming vehicle were analysed in order to investigate how increased expectancy and 
working memory load influenced the participants’ anticipatory attention scheduling strategies. 
 
As in Paper II, repeated exposure reduced response time. With repeated exposure, both non-
loaded and loaded subjects increased the number of glances towards the oncoming vehicle. 
However, as discussed above, working memory load did not affect braking responses in this 
scenario. However, working memory load affected adaptive strategies employed by the 
subjects. While many non-loaded subjects, with repeated exposure, initiated braking in 
anticipation of the event, such strategies were rarely adopted by loaded subjects. Moreover, 
many non-loaded drivers began to focus visual attention strongly on the oncoming vehicle, as 
indicated by significantly longer mean duration of single glances. This indicates a shift in 
attention scheduling strategy that did not occur for loaded drivers.  
 
Interpretation 
The results from Paper II and Paper III question the classical assumption that top-down 
selection is always controlled and bottom-up selection always automatic. In both Paper II and 
III, response times were reduced with repeated exposure but this improvement was not 
significantly affected by working memory load. Similarly, in Paper III, both loaded and non-
loaded subjects increased the number of glances towards the oncoming vehicle with repeated 
exposure. This indicates that at least some forms of top-down selection may proceed 
automatically (i.e., does not rely on cognitive control). This also provides empirical support 
for Trick and Enns’ (2009) two-dimensional framework where automaticity and top-
down/bottom-up selection are treated as separate dimensions. The mechanism behind this 
automatic top-down selection is probably closely related to the contextual cueing 
phenomenon studied by Chun and Jiang (1998, 1999). These authors found in a series of 
laboratory experiments that co-varying patterns (that is, consistent mappings) could be 
learned implicitly (without awareness) and subsequently guide attention top-down in visual 
search. In terms of the present model, such contextual cueing may be conceptualised in terms 
of the activation of higher-level task context schemata which subsequently bias associated 
basic schemata responsible, for example, for braking avoidance and visual orientation towards 
potential hazards.  
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However, as indicated by Paper III, certain aspects of top-down selection do seem to rely on 
cognitive control, as indicated by the difference in single glance duration and braking 
strategies between loaded and non-loaded subjects. In terms of the present model, a key role 
of cognitive control is to override strongly automatised schemata in order to enable flexible 
behaviour when needed. In this scenario, the ability to maintain gaze fixed at the oncoming 
vehicle for an extended time period requires the overriding of habitual tendencies, for 
example, checking the traffic light at the intersection. Hence cognitive control is needed to 
enforce this change in scanning strategy, which explains why this ability is impaired by a 
working memory task that competes for cognitive control. Thus, the hypothesis proposed in 
the previous section, that working memory load mainly affects controlled performance, may 
be extended to the case of top-down attention scheduling: Working memory load leaves 
habitual (top-down, automatic) attention scheduling strategies unaffected but impairs the 
deployment of more flexible, deliberate (top-down, controlled), scheduling strategies.  
 
An important aspect of the findings from Paper III was that the between-subject variance, in 
particular for brake onset time and single glance duration, increased strongly when the critical 
event was repeated. This effect was strongest for non-loaded subjects but occurred also for the 
loaded group. In terms of the present model, there are several potential sources of such 
variance. First, the main reason for the large variance between non-loaded subjects was 
clearly that only a subset of them adopted flexible strategies such as anticipatory braking or 
fixating gaze on the oncoming vehicle. In terms of the model, such strategies involve 
cognitive control, are deployed with effort, and thus depend ultimately on the goals and 
motivations of the individual subject. In an experimental situation, some subjects may be keen 
to demonstrate that they are able to avoid crashing into the oncoming vehicle, thus investing 
effort to perform in a more optimising mode, while others may be more indifferent (due to the 
lack of real risk), thus operating in a more satisficing mode. A second source of variance is 
that habitual attention scheduling schemata are strongly individual, as they have been shaped 
by previous experience and also strongly influenced by subjective value. Thus some subjects 
may have a stronger habitual tendency to scan the road for pedestrians or checking the traffic 
light, which will affect how their habitual attention scheduling patterns develop with repeated 
exposure (for example, a loaded subject with a strong “check traffic light” schema will devote 
fewer glances to the oncoming vehicle than a subject with a weaker “check traffic light” 
schema). Such individual differences could indeed be observed during the manual analysis of 
visual behaviour for Paper III. More generally, drivers also differ with respect to their 
preferred safety margins (i.e., the size of their comfort zones). As discussed above, this may 
explain the larger between-subject variance for loaded drivers with respect to mean speed 
found in Paper III. Whether drivers will increase or reduce speed when resorting to habitual 
behaviour under working memory load depends on their “default” safety margins. The present 
model offers a useful conceptualisation of such individual differences.  
 
Paper V discusses how the model may account for the classical finding of Summala and 
colleagues (e.g., Summala and Räsänen, 2000; see Chapter 2 above) that a familiar context 
may induce erroneous expectations that do not match the situation at hand. In terms of the 
model, this occurs due to the initial bottom-up selection of a default, largely automatised, 
“turn-right at T-junction” context schema, which, in turn activates associated basic schemata 
such as “look left” and “search for cars” top-down. The model may also explain the finding 
by Theeuwes (1996) that response times and time to fixate a road sign depended on whether 
they were placed in an expected location: To the extent that the sign location matches the 
drivers’ context-induced schemata, search should be fast. If there is a mismatch, search is 
slower. Finally, the model suggests a general explanation for inattentional blindness in terms 
 58
of top-down application of a mismatching schema. Even if a stimulus manages to attract gaze 
bottom-up it will not influence behaviour if it fails to override the prevailing schemata. This is 
more difficult in perceptually loading conditions (Lavie, 2010) where competing schemata are 
actively suppressed. However, inherently strong schemata, that is, those that are largely 
automatised, should be relatively immune to inattentional blindness. This is in line with 
findings by Mack and Rock (1998) that familiar stimuli, such as ones own name, have a 
stronger chance to “break through” inattentional blindness. 
 
This suggests several interesting directions for future empirical work. In particular, it would 
be interesting to investigate how attention scheduling strategies are affected by working 
memory load in less critical, and more naturalistic, situations such as the turn right at T-
junction scenario studied by Summala and Räsänen (2000). The model predicts that habitual 
scanning strategies should be relatively preserved under working memory load but less 
flexible and more stereotyped compared to strategies adopted by non-loaded drivers. 
Moreover, loaded drivers should be more susceptible to capture errors (Norman and Shallice, 
1986), that is, the automatic triggering of an inappropriate schema when cognitive control is 
unavailable to correct it. Basic research has demonstrated that working memory load, similar 
to pre-frontal damage (Norman and Shallice, 1986), impairs the inhibition of automatic, 
reflexive, behaviours (Roberts, Hager and Heron, 1994; Lavie, 2010). To the knowledge of 
the author, such effects have not been investigated in the driving domain. 
 
6.2.4 Summary 
This section summarises the main empirical findings discussed in the previous three sections. 
The present results clearly demonstrate that visual and purely working memory-loading tasks 
affect driving performance in very different ways. Paper I demonstrated, in line with previous 
studies, that visually demanding tasks while driving impairs lane keeping performance and 
leads to a compensatory reduction in speed. Other studies (experimental as well as 
naturalistic) have demonstrated that visual diversion from the road strongly impairs the ability 
to respond to critical events such as a lead vehicle that brakes unexpectedly. However, even in 
a controlled experimental setting such as in Paper I, the effect of visual time sharing on 
performance cannot be predicted solely based on dual task interference due to limited 
capacity. Rather, the effect will be strongly determined by adaptive strategies, such as slowing 
down and allowing lane keeping performance to deteriorate as long as safety margins are not 
violated. 
 
The present results further suggest that, by contrast to visual tasks, working memory load 
selectively affects controlled performance (deliberation and exploration) while leaving 
automatic performance (reflex and habit) unaffected. This idea resolves several apparent 
inconsistencies in the driver distraction literature. This leads to very different predictions 
compared to central bottleneck models which suggest that working memory load will disrupt 
all aspects of driving due to competition for a single bottleneck. 
 
Finally, Paper II and Paper III specifically addressed mechanisms behind top-down selection 
and attention scheduling (Aim 4). The results offer empirical support for Trick and Enns’ 
(2009) suggestion that top-down attention selection and scheduling is often automatic 
(habitual). However, it was also found that working memory load may affect more deliberate, 
flexible, scheduling strategies, thus leading to more stereotyped, rigid proactive behaviour. 
This also further supports the general hypothesis that the key effect of working memory load 
is to induce to a resort to reflex and habit. 
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6.3 Generalisability of experimental studies 
An important aim of the present thesis (Aim 4) was to address the issue of how well 
experimental results on attention in driving might generalise to the real world. This section 
discusses this issue based on the present theoretical developments and empirical findings 
discussed in the previous sections.  
 
In the driver distraction literature, rather strong claims are often made about the implications 
of driving performance impairments observed in experimental studies for actual road safety. 
For example, in a paper comparing the effects of alcohol and working memory load on 
driving performance, Strayer, Drews and Crouch (2004) stated: 
 
“Drivers using a cell phone exhibited a delay in their response to events in the driving 
scenario and were more likely to be involved in a traffic accident. Drivers in the alcohol 
condition exhibited a more aggressive driving style, following closer to the vehicle 
immediately in front of them, necessitating braking with greater force. With respect to traffic 
safety, the data suggest that the impairments associated with cell phone drivers may be as 
great as those commonly observed with intoxicated drivers.” (p. 381). 
 
With respect to visual tasks, it was suggested in Section 6.2.1, based on the results from Paper 
I, that effects of time sharing on driving cannot be predicted solely based on dual task 
interference related to limited capacity, but also strongly depends on adaptive attention 
allocation and behaviour. In Paper I, visual time sharing impaired lane keeping performance 
in the simulators but not in the field. Moreover, Victor et al. (2005), analysing the same data 
set, found shorter off-road glances in the field. It was suggested that this was due to the fact 
that drivers adopted larger safety margins in the field and, as a consequence, reduced single 
glance duration and did not allow lateral control to deteriorate. Hence, the effects of a visually 
demanding task on visual behaviour and driving performance could generally be expected to 
be exaggerated in simulators compared to the real world. However, the general finding that 
off-road glances strongly delay responses to critical events seem to apply in experimental 
settings (Summala, Nieminen and Punto, 1996; Lee et al., 2002.; Horrey et al., 2006) as well 
as in the field (Klauer et al., 2006; Olson et al., 2009; Hickman, 2010). 
 
For working memory loading tasks, the response delays commonly found in lead vehicle 
braking scenarios are often suggested to be directly related to increased crash risk, as 
exemplified, for example, by the quote above (see also the recent white paper by the National 
Safety Council; NSC, 2010). However, the findings of the present thesis question the 
generality of such results. Paper II found a response delay due to working memory load to a 
lead vehicle braking event cued by brake lights. However, no such effect was found in Paper 
III where the responses to the oncoming lead vehicle were triggered solely by 
looming/movement cues. This is in line with other studies that found response delays only for 
cued tasks (Muttart et al., 2007; Baumann et al., 2008). Moreover, the meta-analysis in 
Engström (2010a) indicated that the magnitude of the response delay depends critically on 
scenario criticality (initial time headway). As criticality increases (initial headway is reduced), 
the response delay is strongly reduced.  
 
As discussed in Section, 6.2.2, these findings may be explained by the general hypothesis that 
working memory load mainly affects controlled performance while leaving automatic 
performance unaffected. From this perspective, it may be suggested that existing experimental 
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studies have mainly demonstrated impairments of working memory load on controlled 
performance (e.g., responding to brake lights, visual exploration, encoding semantic 
information etc.). However, real world driving is to a large extent habitual and reflexive (i.e., 
automatic), at least for experienced drivers. In particular, responses to hazards could be 
expected to be mainly reflexively triggered, for example, by looming cues, and should thus, as 
indicated by the results of Paper III, be minimally affected by working memory load. Hence, 
response delays found for cued events in experimental studies may not generalise well to real 
world critical situations. As indicated by Paper III, this should also hold for habitual aspects 
of driving such as lane keeping and routine proactive attention scheduling. Thus, the present 
findings suggest that experimental results on the effects of working memory load on driving 
performance should be interpreted with great caution. 
 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, naturalistic driving studies have generally not found elevated risk 
due to working memory loading tasks. The idea that working memory load selectively affects 
controlled performance may partly explain this apparent discrepancy with experimental dual 
task studies. However, it does not explain why working memory load should have a protective 
effect, as found by Olson et al., (2009) and Hickman et al., (2010) for commercial heavy 
vehicle drivers conversing on a hands-free phone or a CB radio. A further possibility is that 
arousal associated with cognitive control deployment helps to keep the driver alert during 
monotonous driving, which may help to prevent drowsiness-related critical events (Hanowski, 
personal communication). Such an effect would naturally be expected to be most prevalent for 
commercial vehicle drivers who often drive for long hours on monotonous routes, which may 
explain why the protective effect was not found in the 100-car study. However, it may be 
further speculated that the gaze concentration effect induced by working memory load (Paper 
I, Paper III) may reduce the risk of safety critical events due to an increased likelihood that 
gaze is directed on-road in the case of an unexpected event.  
 
However, that said, it cannot be ruled out that working memory load leads to more 
“upstream” effects, for example, due to failures to interpret and encode semantic information. 
This may induce erroneous expectancies and subsequent errors in top-down selection which 
may lead to critical situations. Such factors may not have been captured in existing 
naturalistic driving analyses, which typically analysed a time window 5 seconds before the 
crash. More detailed analysis of naturalistic driving data, focusing more on the reasons for 
schema-situation mismatches may help to resolve these issues. This topic is further addressed 
in the following section. 
 
6.4 How do attention failures lead to crashes? 
The ultimate motivation for the present research was the question how problems in attention 
selection may lead to crashes. The final aim of the present thesis was to define a general 
conceptualisation of how attention selection relates to crashes based on the proposed attention 
selection model (Paper V).  
 
A general conceptualisation of the relation between normal driving, conflicts and crashes of 
different severity is illustrated in Figure 12 (adopted from Victor et al. 2010, building on the 
classical Heinrich triangle). Normal driving situations develop relatively often into non-severe 
conflicts. In most of these cases, the situation is quickly recovered by the driver. According to 
the present framework, such situations result in a feeling of discomfort (triggered by the value 
system) and are critical for learning anticipatory avoidance behaviours (Fuller, 1984; 
Summala and Räsänen, 2000; Fuller, 2007; Summala, 2007; Vaa, 2007; Paper IV; Paper V). 
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However, sometimes events develop into more severe situations and, very infrequently, into 
crashes. A key issue for accident analysis is thus to understand the mechanisms whereby 
normal driving evolves into a critical situations and further into crashes. Of equal importance, 
however, is to understand the mechanisms that lead to successful recovery from critical 
situations. 
 
 
 
Figure 12 Conceptualisation of the relation between normal driving, incidents and crashes (from 
Victor et al., 2010; f=frequency) 
 
Until recently, not much was known about how events in the pre-crash phase lead to crashes 
and even less about the precise role that attention selection may play in this process. 
However, as reviewed in Section 2.1.2, this situation has now changed with the advent of 
naturalistic driving studies. However, a conceptual framework for describing how attention 
failures relate to conflicts and crashes is still lacking. Based on the proposed attention 
selection model, Paper V suggests an initial step in this direction, briefly described in the 
following section. 
 
Towards an novel accident model 
In Paper V, it was suggested attention selection serves two key functions in preventing 
crashes, which may be conceptualised as barriers. The first is the proactive barrier which 
prevents drivers to enter into critical situations by means of top-down selection of schemata 
based on anticipation on how situations will develop. This proactive selection, which 
develops with driving experience, is often habitual but may also be guided by cognitive 
control when needed. Critical situations may occur when there is a mismatch between the 
proactively selected schema and the actual situation. In such cases, the second, reactive, 
barrier may prevent a crash by triggering rapid bottom-up (reflexive) selection of avoidance 
schemata. The proposed accident model is illustrated in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13 A conceptual model relating attention failures to crashes (from Paper V) 
 
According to this model, a key goal of crash/near crash analysis is thus to identify (1) reasons 
for why proactive selection resulted in a schema-situation mismatch (breakdowns of the 
proactive barrier) and (2) why reactive selection failed to trigger a timely avoidance reaction 
(breakdowns of the reactive barrier). While existing naturalistic driving studies have shed 
much light on the latter question, reasons why drivers select the wrong schema in the first 
place have rarely been addressed. Preliminary candidates for reasons of the two types of 
failures are outlined in Paper V.  
  
A preliminary, yet unpublished, application of these ideas to the analysis of publicly available 
data from the 100-car study is described in the Addendum. 
 
Application to accident and incident analysis 
While the present thesis have not provided a conclusive answer to the question how attention 
failures lead to crashes, it suggests some potential ways forward in the search for this holy 
grail of driver attention research. In particular, the novel accident model proposed above may 
provide guidance on “what to look for” in accident and incident analysis in terms of a set of 
proactive and reactive selection failures. However, the model, and in particular the attention 
failure categories suggested in Paper V, should be viewed as preliminary and needs to be 
validated against real data. 
 
A key feature of the present model is the emphasis on attention failures related to 
inappropriate actions, in particular taking the eyes off road at the wrong moment, rather than 
overload of central attentional capacity. At least for the limited set of rear-end crashes and 
near crashes analysed in the Addendum, it may be observed that the central capacity 
limitations or information overload appear to be of little relevance for explaining why these 
rear-end crashes occurred. Rather, the key mechanism was that the driver chose to look away 
at an inopportune moment. During the off-road glance, the lead vehicle braked and looming 
cues were unable to trigger an avoidance reaction since the looming cues occurred outside the 
field of view. In some cases, the narrative written by the video analyst indicated that the 
driver was misled by contextual cues to look away. However, in most cases, the precise 
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reason for looking away was not possible to infer from the narrative. In any case, there was no 
evidence that it was due to overload of central attentional capacity.  
 
Naturalistic driving studies have so far mainly been concerned with failures of the reactive 
barrier, in particular how crashes often occur when off-road glances coincide with unexpected 
events. However, they have so far provided little information about the reasons for failures of 
the proactive barrier. In particular, the question why a driver involved in a crash decided to 
take the eyes off the road in the first place remains largely open. This may be one reason for 
why factors such as working memory load and inattentional blindness have not been 
attributed as key contributing factors in naturalistic driving studies, while they have been 
more commonly identified in in-depth accident analysis and epidemiological studies (Brown, 
2005; Redelmeier and Tibshirani, 1997; McEvoy et al., 2005).  
 
How, then, can we get at breakdowns of the proactive barrier? It is possible that such failures 
are more likely to be found in naturalistic observation if they are explicitly looked for. The 
work by Summala and colleagues (Summala and Räsänen, 2000) represents a good example.  
Moreover, subjective interview data from involved drivers would probably be very useful as a 
complement to naturalistic observation data. However, given that schema selection, according 
to the present model, often occurs automatically, the driver’s memory his/her own attention 
allocation patterns might be limited. A very interesting topic for further research would be to 
compare drivers’ own statements on their beliefs, intentions and actual scan patterns in the 
pre-crash phase to video data. 
 
6.5 Application to inattention countermeasure and evaluation method 
development 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, the present research is mainly intended to be applied in three general 
areas: (a) Accident and incident analysis, (b) the development of countermeasures for 
attention failures and (c) the development of methods for evaluating such countermeasures.  
The application to accident and incident analysis was discussed in the previous section while 
this section focuses on the two latter application areas. 
 
6.5.1 Inattention countermeasures 
There are several possible ways in which the different types of attention-related failures 
discussed in this thesis could be counteracted. Below a number of inattention countermeasure 
are discussed based on the findings of the present thesis. 
 
Safe human-machine interface design 
The design of the in-vehicle human-machine interface is naturally of key importance to 
minimise distraction from secondary tasks. Recent results from naturalistic driving studies 
(Klauer et al., 2006; Olson et al., 2009; Hickman et al., 2010), provide strong arguments for 
non-visual means for interaction, such as voice control. However, the working memory 
demands imposed by such systems should not be neglected. As voice-based interfaces grow in 
complexity, there is a risk that the operation of such systems (e.g., navigating through 
complex menus) may place high demands on working memory. As indicated by the present 
results, in particular Paper III, high working memory load may induce a resort to reflex and 
habit, resulting in rigid, inflexible, behaviour which may turn out to be critical in situations 
where behavioural flexibility is required. Moreover, as also found in Paper III, working 
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memory load strongly impairs the semantic encoding of information. This may lead to failures 
in perceiving safety critical information such as traffic signs, and may thus impair subsequent 
top-down selection. It should be stressed that, that although crash contributing factors 
associated with working memory load have not shown up in naturalistic driving studies, it is 
still unclear to what extent this is due to their actual infrequency or limitations in current 
naturalistic data analysis methodologies. Thus, while the present framework supports the 
development of non-visual interfaces, the issue of excessive working memory demands must 
be carefully addressed in in-vehicle interface design. 
 
The present thesis also emphasises the subjective, emotional, value of a task as a key factor 
that determines its distraction potential. According to the present framework, the decision to 
engage in a task in a particular situation is due to a balance between the motivation to 
complete the task and the perceived discomfort when uncertainty builds up and driving 
performance deteriorates during task engagement. Thus, a driver will be more willing to 
engage in a demanding secondary task in a potentially risky situation if the task is strongly 
associated with positive value. This implies that the most hazardous secondary tasks should 
be those that induce strong (peripheral-, structural- and control-) interference with driving but 
at the same time are strongly associated with value. As suggested in Paper V, text messaging 
on a cell phone is a prime example of such a task. This may explain the extreme risk found for 
text messaging in naturalistic driving studies (Olson et al., 2009; Hickman, 2010; Section 
2.1.2). This implies that certain functions that are currently finding their way into modern 
vehicles, such as social media, may impose very strong crash risks, which are not solely 
determined by interface design. 
 
Proactive information 
With the advent of wireless technologies for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) or vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2I) communication, there are increasing possibilities to provide drivers with 
advance information on upcoming events, such as accidents, traffic queues and slippery road 
conditions. According the present framework, this type of information may be very useful for 
supporting the proactive selection of appropriate schemata, thus facilitating correct 
expectancies and reducing the risk for breakdowns of the proactive barrier. Some studies have 
already demonstrated such benefits of onboard navigation systems (van der Horst and 
Martens, 2010). 
 
Distraction mitigation 
Camera-based computer vision technology has made it possible to unintrusively monitor 
drivers’ eye and/or head movements. This may be used to alert the driver on inappropriate 
visual behaviours, such as long off-road glances (see examples in Engström and Victor, 
2009). A key issue here is the transparency of the alert, so that the driver knows how to 
improve visual behaviour based on the feedback. This type of function may also be used in 
more general safety management programs as further discussed below.   
 
Collision avoidance warnings 
A key implication of the present model is that the bottom-up response to a warning signal 
may be faster, and more likely to “break through”, if the signal is associated with emotional 
value. This suggests potential applications for emotional (value associated) warning signals. 
In support of this idea, Gray (2011) demonstrated that auditory looming and car horn signals 
were superior to neutral warnings in speeding up braking responses in a lead vehicle braking 
scenario. However, the horn signal produced a significantly greater number of responses to 
false alarms than the veridical looming warnings, thus indicating a significant benefit of the 
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latter. See also Larsson et al. (2009) for related work. Lee (2006) offers a general review of 
the key role of emotion in human factors engineering.  
 
Behaviour-based safety management 
Behaviour-based safety management programs are commonly employed by commercial 
vehicle fleets to obtain long-term behavioural change among their drivers towards a safer 
driving style (Hickman et al. 2007). These programs generally involve some form of 
performance monitoring combined with incentive programs (Barton and Tardif, 2002). 
Recently, there has been an increased focus on drivers’ attention allocation strategies as one 
of the targets for such programs, enabled by unintrusive attention monitoring technologies 
(Engström and Victor, 2009). Given that, as suggested in the present thesis, much of attention 
allocation behaviour is automatic and unconscious, governed by overlearned schemata, such 
programs could have a strong potential in bringing inappropriate behaviours to the drivers 
conscious attention and support a long-term improvement in attention allocation strategies. In 
terms of the present model, such a long-term behavioural change implies the establishment of 
new habitual schemata which initially requires attentional effort (cognitive control) to 
override existing dominant habits. This emphasises to the important role of sufficiently 
motivating incentive schemes. The learning of improved attention scheduling schemata may 
also be facilitated by computer-based training, for example, using driving simulators (Pradhan 
et al., 2009) 
 
Infrastructure design 
According the present framework, drivers’ attention allocation strategies are strongly 
determined by the environmental context. Hence, the design of infrastructure elements plays a 
key role in triggering schemata and hence driver expectancies. Thus, as suggested by 
Theeuwes and Godthelp (1995), “self-explaining roads” that reliably trigger appropriate 
schemata should have a strong potential for improving road safety. 
 
6.5.2 Evaluation methods 
An important issue, which has been the subject of several major research initiatives, is how to 
evaluate in-vehicle functions with respect to their, positive or negative, effect on attention. 
This may involve the distraction potential of a new interface design (e.g., Östlund et al., 2004; 
Angell et al., 2006) or the ability of active safety systems to support crash avoidance by 
alerting the driver on potential hazards (Ljung Aust and Engström, 2010). These topics are 
addressed in the following two sections.  
 
Evaluating the distraction potential of human-machine interfaces 
Based on the present framework, there are three main aspects of an in-vehicle human-machine 
interface design that determines is distraction potential and hence are relevant to evaluate in 
laboratory-based assessment. The first is the degree to which the system requires visual-
manual interaction, in particular the degree to which long single glances are needed to extract 
relevant information. The second is the degree to which the system supports proactive task 
management. The third is the degree to which the interaction with the system requires the 
deployment of cognitive control (e.g., by demands on working memory). 
 
The first aspect is possible to capture by means of eye movement analysis (Victor et al., 2008; 
ISO, 2002). Alternatively, the occlusion technique (Foley, 2008; ISO, 2007) offers a cheaper 
and less laborious way to assess the need for visual interaction. The occlusion technique also 
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offers a way to measure the second aspect (proactive task management) in terms of 
interruptability (Foley, 2008).  
 
In order to measure the demand for cognitive control, the Detection Response Task (DRT) 
paradigm (van der Horst and Martens, 2010; Engström, 2010b) seems to be the most 
promising option available. The method has repeatedly been shown to be sensitive to different 
levels of working memory load as well as driving demand (van der Horst and Martens, 2010; 
Engström, 2010b). According to the present model (Paper V), the effect of working memory 
load on the DRT mainly occurs since responding to these types of artificial stimuli relies on 
cognitive control, which is depleted by working memory loading tasks (see Engström, 
2010b). This explains why effects of secondary tasks on DRT performance are generally 
independent of visual eccentricity and even the sensory modality of the DRT stimulus (e.g., 
Merat and Jamson, 2008; see review in Engström, 2010b). However, one open issue concerns 
the application of the DRT to measure the working memory load of visual manual tasks. In 
this case, it is possible that the DRT is also sensitive to structural interference effects related 
to concurrent manual responses (for example providing manual input to a system with one 
hand while pushing the DRT button with the other). Such effects may thus mask the more 
global effects related to cognitive control deployment (control interference). This issue clearly 
needs to be investigated in further development of the DRT method.  
 
To the extent that it is practically feasible, physiological measures of arousal such as heart 
rate and skin conductance may yield further indices on the degree of cognitive control 
deployed (Mehler et al., 2010).  
 
However, measures of lateral and longitudinal control (such as standard deviation of lane 
position and speed) are clearly not well suited for evaluation of secondary task demand. As 
discussed in Section 6.2.1, for visual tasks such measures mainly reflect adaptive task 
management strategies rather than the interference caused by the system under evaluation. For 
working memory loading tasks, the direction of the effect on lane keeping appears to depend 
on the difficulty of the lane keeping task (as discussed in Section 6.2.2). Moreover, working 
memory load may affect speed and headway in both directions, possibly depending on the 
relation between the drivers’ “default” speed/headway and the posted speed limit and/or 
instructions (as discussed in Section 6.2.2). Thus, neither for visual, nor cognitive tasks, do 
vehicle control measures provide an accurate estimation of secondary task load. 
 
Finally, as already discussed, laboratory based evaluation is not able to capture the 
motivational factors that determine the willingness to engage in distraction in the in real 
world, or the adaptive strategies that the driver may employ to manage the dual task situation. 
In the real world the emotional value of a task will critically determine to what extent drivers 
will engage in it in potentially critical situations. Hence, while dual-task, laboratory-based, 
distraction assessment (using e.g., occlusion or the DRT) may be very useful during system 
development, they would be less suitable as the basis for general consumer testing 
methodologies (generating star ratings similar to EuroNCAP). Since, according to the present 
framework, the real world distraction potential of a task is only partly determined by the 
interface design, such tests may yield misleading indications on which tasks are suitable to 
perform while driving and which are not. The real-world distraction potential of a secondary 
task can probably only be captured in naturalistic driving studies. 
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Evaluating the effectiveness of active safety systems 
As discussed in Paper IV, evaluating active safety systems in controlled experiments is 
notoriously difficult. The goal is generally to create critical scenarios that are sufficiently 
representative to the real world pre-crash scenarios targeted by the active safety system. 
However, the key problem is that drivers who anticipate critical scenarios will adopt various 
adaptive strategies, including shifts in attention allocation strategies to remain inside their 
comfort zones. The experimenter thus has to invent various means to trick the drivers out of 
their comfort zones at the right moment in time (see Paper IV). See also Ljung Aust and 
Engström (2010) for a more general application of the conceptual framework outlined in 
Paper IV to active safety system requirement specification and evaluation. 
 
A recent study by Ljung Aust, Engström and Viström (in preparation) demonstrated that 
driver’s responses to collision warnings in experimental settings is the result of relatively 
complex adaptation and attention allocation strategies determined by expectations induced by 
repeated exposure to events, as well as the scenario criticality. The present thesis offers a 
conceptual framework for better understanding such effects when designing active safety 
evaluation studies. 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
The general objective of the present thesis was to obtain a better understanding of the relation 
between attention, performance and crash risk. Based on reviews of relevant empirical and 
theoretical work, a number of specific aims were defined.  
 
The first aim was to develop a general conceptual model of attention selection in driving able 
to account for attention selection as it occurs in natural driving situations. The present 
framework (Paper IV and V) represents a shift in perspective from the traditional notion of 
attention as a resource or bottleneck with limited capacity to a view of attention selection as a 
key aspect of adaptive driver behaviour. From this perspective, the key function of attention in 
driving is to select the right information at the right time to support the accomplishment of 
(driving and non-driving related) task goals while at the same time ensuring the maintenance 
of acceptable safety margins. Such a view accounts for a range of key phenomena that are 
difficult to conceptualise in terms of limited capacity such as expectancy, dynamic attention 
scheduling and attentional self-regulation. Moreover, while traditional models have tended to 
focus on effortful and conscious (i.e., controlled) aspects of attention, the present model, in 
line with Trick and Enns (2009), suggests a broader view of attention which also includes 
reflexive and habitual (i.e., automatic) selection, which are of key importance in natural 
driving. However, at the same time, the proposed model offers a novel taxonomy of different 
dual task interference mechanisms which is useful for characterising different forms of driver 
inattention and distraction. 
 
A further key aim of the present thesis was to obtain a better understanding of the effects of 
secondary tasks on driving performance. Effects of visual time sharing are relatively well 
understood. Although visual tasks may induce central attentional interference (structural and 
control interference according to the present model), it may be concluded that the key effect 
in driving is related to basic peripheral interference resulting from off-road glances. In 
particular, off road glances severely delays responses to unexpected critical events (such as a 
lead vehicle braking) and this could be regarded as the key known attention-related 
mechanism that gives rise to road crashes. However, the further issue, relating to proactive 
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attention scheduling, why drivers sometimes decide to take their eyes off the road at 
inopportune moments has not been thoroughly addressed. 
 
The effects of working memory load on driving performance are less well understood and, 
hence, this was a major focus of the empirical work in the present thesis (Aim 2). As 
reviewed in Chapter 2, studies on working memory load have generated apparently 
inconsistent results. The results from the present thesis (Paper III) suggest that these 
inconsistencies may be largely resolved based on the idea that working memory load 
selectively affects controlled performance (deliberation and exploration) while leaving 
automatic performance (reflex and habit) unaffected. However, this novel hypothesis clearly 
needs to be further validated empirically. 
 
The thesis also examined mechanisms behind expectancy and proactive attention scheduling 
strategies (Aim 3). The present results (Paper II and III) demonstrated, contrary to common 
belief, that basic top-down, proactive, attention selection and scheduling may operate 
automatically, without the need for cognitive control. However, more flexible attention 
allocation strategies require cognitive control and are inhibited by working memory load. This 
further supports the general idea that the key effect of working memory load is to induce a 
resort to reflex and habit, which leads to inflexible, stereotyped behaviour. 
 
An important aim of the thesis was to clarify to what extent results from experimental studies, 
in particular studies on the effects of driver distraction on driving performance, can be 
generalised to the real world (Aim 4). It may be concluded that the common finding that 
visual diversion from the road strongly delays responses to unexpected critical events are well 
in line with the results of naturalistic driving studies. However, the present findings strongly 
indicate that experimental results on the effect of working memory load should be interpreted 
with caution. As discussed above, the present results indicate that working memory load 
selectively affects controlled driving performance. It could thus be suggested that many 
experimental studies measured impairments in controlled performance while such 
impairments would not necessarily occur in routine real world situations were performance is 
largely automatised (reflexive and habitual). This may be one reason for the apparent 
discrepancies between naturalistic driving and experimental studies with respect to the effects 
of working memory load. However, it may also be the case that existing naturalistic driving 
analyses have failed to identify more upstream accident-contributing factors related to 
working memory load. Further empirical work is needed to resolve these issues. 
 
Finally, although the present thesis does not offer the final answer to the question how 
attention failures lead to crashes, it suggests a novel way to approach the problem (Aim 6). 
Specifically, it was suggested that attention related failures may be divided into two general 
categories: (a) failures of critical stimuli to trigger a last-second avoidance manoeuvre 
bottom-up and (b) failures that lead to a mismatch between top-down, proactively selected, 
schemata and the actual situation. In terms of the suggested accident model, the former may 
be referred to as breakdowns of the reactive barrier and the latter as breakdowns of the 
proactive barrier. Naturalistic driving studies have forcefully demonstrated that eyes-off-road 
is the key factor behind breakdowns of the reactive barrier. The most important challenge for 
future accident and incident research is to identify the key mechanisms behind breakdowns of 
the proactive barrier, for example, what makes driver take the eyes off road at inopportune 
moments. The present thesis has provided some initial ideas of potential mechanisms behind 
such failures (Paper V), but much further research is needed to validate these ideas against 
empirical data. Such work could involve experimental studies, accident and incident analysis 
 69
(in particular based on naturalistic driving data) as well as the development of computational 
simulation models of attention selection mechanisms which could be based on the conceptual 
model outlined in this thesis. 
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Addendum: Analysis of rear-end crashes and near crashes in 
the 100-car study 
 
In order to examine the applicability of the accident model outlined in Section 6.4, a 
preliminary (yet unpublished) analysis was carried out on publicly available naturalistic data 
from the 100-car study. The analysis focused on rear end crashes and near crashes and used 
vehicle and manually reduced gaze data which were synchronised and plotted using Matlab. 
Moreover, narratives from the video analysis were used (however, videos were not directly 
analysed since these are not publicly available). An example of the data used for the analysis 
is given in A1.  
 
 
 
Figure A1 Example of 100-car data used for the present analysis 
 
The 100-car database was initially searched for all crash events (i.e. events where “Event 
Severity” was assigned to “Crash”) with the variable “Event Nature” assigned to “Conflict 
with a lead vehicle”. A further criterion was that the speed, brake, longitudinal acceleration 
and front radar data should be available. 10 events fulfilled these criteria. Two of these where 
excluded as they were not representative of typical rear-end conflict situations: In one case 
(event no. 8856), the subject vehicle hit a spinning vehicle coming from the left lane in the 
rear and the other case (event no. 8733) occurred during parallel parking. The 8 remaining 
events were retained for detailed analysis. 
 
In order to also investigate cases of successful avoidance, the database was also searched for 
near crashes with “Event Nature” assigned to “Conflict with a lead vehicle”, which resulted in 
a total of 240 events that also satisfied the criteria of complete time series data. From these, 8 
events were randomly selected for detailed analysis. 
 
 80
The data were analysed based on the accident model outlined in Section 6.4 (Figure 13). 
Thus, the goal was to identify (1) mismatches between the proactively selected schema and 
the how the situation developed and (2) reasons why last-second reactive selection failed (for 
crashes) and succeeded (for near-crashes). To be able to aggregate the data, a set of 
preliminary pre-crash factors was defined and each event was analysed in terms of a causation 
tree similar to that used in the DREAM method for in-depth accident analysis (Sandin, 2008). 
The aggregated result for the eight near crashes is shown in Figure A2. As can be seen in the 
Figure, the crash events were very homogenous in terms of causation patterns. In all but one 
case, the critical event occurred due to selection of a competing schema which coincided with 
the lead vehicle braking unexpectedly. The competing activity involved both driving-related 
activities (such as looking for other traffic or checking the mirror) and non-driving activities 
(e.g., rubbing the eye). This resulted in an, often very long, glance away from the road which 
was the main reason for the failure of the closing lead vehicle to trigger a timely avoidance 
reaction. In the one remaining case, the driver fell into sleep just before the lead vehicle 
braked. Based on the narratives, it was difficult to identify the precise reason why the drivers 
selected the competing schema. However, in two cases it seemed like drivers were “tricked” 
to look away by misleading contextual cues induced by the behaviour of the lead vehicle. 
Thus, for example, in the narrative shown in Figure A1, the lead vehicle moved forward as if 
to complete the turn, which led the driver to look left to check for traffic.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2 Aggregated causation tree for the eight rear-end crashes. Numbers on the arrows indicate 
the number of events following this path. The red line indicates the schema situation mismatch. 
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The corresponding analysis for the randomly selected eight near crashes is shown in A3. As 
can be seen, the causation patterns were here more heterogeneous. The key causation pattern 
that was observed for the crashes (eyes-off road due to mismatching proactive selection of a 
competing schema) was found in four cases. The key reason for the successful escapes was 
that the drivers looked back to the road early enough for a timely reactive selection to take 
place. In addition, there were several cases where an unexpected event (e.g. the lead vehicle 
braking, changing deceleration rate or cutting in) occurred when the driver already had his/her 
eyes on the road. This enabled a fast bottom-up reaction and a timely avoidance reaction.  
 
 
Figure A3 Aggregated causation tree for the eight, randomly selected, rear-end near crashes. Numbers 
on the arrows indicate the number of events following this path. The red line indicates the schema 
situation mismatch. 
 
While the present analysis should be viewed as preliminary, it illustrates the potential value of 
the present attention selection model in guiding the analysis of naturalistic driving data. In 
particular, the 2-stage accident model provides guidance on “what to look for” in the analysis 
in terms of a set of proactive and reactive selection failures. 
 
A comparison between the causation patterns for crashes and near crashes shows that the 
latter are much more heterogeneous. In particular, eyes off-road, disabling the reactive barrier, 
seems to be the single factor that make rear-end conflicts develop into crashes. 
 
While the present analysis provides a rather detailed picture on mechanisms relating to the 
second barrier (i.e., reasons for failures in last second reactive selection), it says relatively 
little about the reasons for why the mismatching schema was selected in the first place (in the 
present cases, why the driver chose to take the eyes off the road). It is likely that more 
 82
information on this may be extracted from actual video data (rather than the short narratives 
used here). Moreover, subjective interview data from involved drivers would probably be 
very useful as a complement.  
 
